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The Origins of a Coming Crisis:
Renewal of the Churchill Falls Contract

The 1969 Churchill Falls contract between Hydro-Quebec and the Churchill Falls
Labrador Corporation has been the subject of political controversy. It has also
been challenged in the courts, with appeals reaching to the Supreme Court of
Canada. Yet, despite the scrutiny of those court cases, the political rhetoric, and
the literature that has been spawned by this matter, an extraordinary element of
that contract remains remarkably obscure. It is the contract's renewal clause. At
the expiry of the contract's forty-four-year term in 2016, that clause requires an
automatic renewal for twenty-five additional years at a fixed nominal price that
is lower than what prevailed in the 1960s. Since many billions of dollars worth
of electricity will be involved, renewal is certain to become a matter of serious
dispute, likely involving political and legal dimensions. The authors provide the
first systematic investigation of the origins of this renewal provision, based largely
on archival sources including hitherto unknown documents, and suggest that the
events at issue may raise questions of business ethics and law

Le contrat des chutes Churchill conclu en 1969 entre Hydro-Qu6bec et la Churchill
Falls (Labrador) Corporation a suscit6 une grande controverse politique. II a
aussi &6 contest6 devant les tribunaux, les parties 6tant m~me all~es jusqu'i
soumettre leurs diff6rends . la Cour supreme du Canada. Pourtant, en d6pit de
l'examen minutieux de ce contrat par les tribunaux dans le cadre des nombreuses
poursuites, en d6pit de la rh6torique politique et en d6pit de toute I'encre qui a
could, un 616ment extraordinaire de ce contrat reste myst~rieux: la clause de
reconduction. Cette disposition pr6voit qu'en 2016, 6 l'expiration des quarantequatre ans que doit durer le contrat, il sera reconduit d'office pour vingt-cinq
ann6es additionnelles, 6 un tarif nominal fixe inf6rieur au tarif en vigueur pendant
les ann6es 1960. Puisque cette reconduction portera sur des milliards de dollars,
il est certain que la reconduction provoquera un diffrend de taille qui aura
vraisemblablement des dimensions politiques et 16gales. Les auteurs pr~sentent
la premiere 6tude exhaustive sur les origines de cette clause de reconduction,
6tude r6alis6e en grande partie grace J des documents d'archive et 6 d'autres
documents dont, jusqu'l tout r6cemment, on ignorait I'existence; ils avancent que
les 6v~nements relat6s pourront soulever des questions quant ' 1'6thique des
affaires et la loi.

Professor of Economics, Memorial University, St. John's, NL.
University Archivist-Historian, Memorial University, St. John's, NL. This paper extends our
working paper, J. Feehan and M..Baker, "The Renewal Clause in the Churchill Falls Contract: The
Origins of a Coming Crisis," Papers in Political Economy, Paper No. 96, (Political Economy Research
Group, University of Western Ontario, 2005). We are grateful to Peter Neary, David Vardy, and two
anonymous referees for helpful advice. Any errors are solely the responsibility of the authors.
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Introduction
The 1969 power contract between Hydro-Qu~bec and the Churchill
Falls (Labrador) Corporation (CFLCo) has been a matter of considerable
resentment in Newfoundland and Labrador. The contract concerns the
development and subsequent sale of electricity from the Churchill Falls
hydro site, one of the world's largest. Almost all the power must be sold
to Hydro-Qu6bec on a very long-term basis at an extremely low price.
Since the mid-1970s the government of Newfoundland and Labrador
has challenged this contract in a number of ways. It has made appeals to
Canadian public opinion; it has made requests to the Quebec authorities
to renegotiate the contract; and it has called on the federal government to
assist in finding a resolution. In the 1980s, the Supreme Court of Canada
heard two appeals arising from actions launched by the Newfoundland
government: one to gain access to a larger portion of the energy and the
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other to test the validity of nullifying the contract by legislative action.1
Both challenges, which were opposed by CFLCo as well as HydroQudbec, failed. None of the other tactics has been successful either.
The perceived injustice of the contract resonates in Newfoundland
political culture, being characterized as another case where its resources
have been exploited by outsiders. Few, if any, would disagree with the
opinion, expressed in 2003, by the provincial Royal Commission on
Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada that the outcome of
the contract is inequitable. 2 Still, Canadians generally and especially
Quebeckers are no doubt weary of on-going complaints about the contract.
It has been almost forty years since the contract was signed. Many may
ask if it is not time to move on rather than dwell on the past.
A major obstacle to "moving on" is the contract's renewal clause,
which takes effect in 2016. That renewal clause has received practically
no public attention and has not been an issue in past litigation. The fortyfour-year term of the contract runs from 1972 to 2016. However, the
contract provides for automatic renewal at the expiry date for a further
twenty-five-year period with the terms predetermined. As such, it amounts
to a contract "piggy-backed" onto a contract. During the renewal period
the price is pre-set at two mills per kilowatt hour. A mill is one-tenth of
a cent, so two mills is 0.2 cents. Even in the late 1960s, a price of two
mills was extraordinarily low and not achievable from any new energy
source then available to Hydro-Qurbec. To put this price in perspective,
in 2004 the average wholesale price of electricity in Ontario was 52.2
mills per kilowatt hour and in 2003 Hydro-Qurbec received an average
of approximately 84.9 mills for its electricity exports. 3 A price of two
mills in 2016 with that price fixed until 2041 is barely distinguishable
from being free. The amount of electricity involved is approximately
30 billion kilowatt hours (30 million megawatt hours) annually. Thus,
the gap between the revenue that CFLCo would receive during renewal
and the wholesale value of the electricity could amount to billions of
dollars per year for twenty-five years. Surely, this is the seed for a serious
!. Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R 297 and Newfoundland
(Attorney-General) v. ChurchillFalls (Labrador)Corporation,[1988] 1 S.C.R. 1085. Both involved
arguments by Newfoundland that the water rights lease between it and CFLCo took precedence over
the contract.
2.
Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada, Final Report (St.
John's: Queen's Printer, 2003) at 122-125.
3.
For wholesale electricity prices in Ontario see the web site of the Independent Electricity System
Operator, <http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/media/mdprices.asp>. For Hydro-Qudbec the figure is
based on data on p. 107 of its 2003 annual report: The Power of Change <http://hydroquebec.com/
publications/en/annual retort/2003/pdf/hydro2003en-complete.pdf>.
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conflict involving the contracting parties and their owners, namely the two
provincial governments.
Of course the existence of this provision is not news to the parties.
But how did such an extraordinarily onerous condition get into the
contract in the first place? One might have thought that this question
would have been thoroughly investigated by now. Amazingly, that has not
happened. In his nearly 400-page tome on Churchill Falls, Philip Smith
4
offers no meaningful insight, devoting only a single sentence to renewal.
The Economic Council of Canada was puzzled by the renewal provision,
noting that it was not required by the financiers and that it was added to
the contract at a very late stage.' Even in articles in the special issue of
Forces devoted to Hydro-Qu6bec's perspectives on the 1969 contract, the
renewal clause is barely mentioned. 6 How anyone would agree to, or ask
for, a renewal clause like this is an enigma.
This article presents the results of the first systematic investigation
of that mysterious clause. To do this, it was necessary to put it in context
by giving due consideration to the process that led to the contract. We
provide that background by drawing on primary sources, including CFLCo
and Hydro-Qudbec correspondence, memoranda, reports and records;
we also rely on hitherto unknown or uncited documents, including ones
obtained under freedom-of-information requests. The findings may raise
substantive questions of business ethics and law.
This article is organized as follows. Part I gives important background
and then reviews the early discussions and the interrelated commercial
and political challenges that had to be overcome before the two parties
could agree on a comprehensive Letter of Intent. Then, Part II turns to
the contract negotiations and the events that specifically led to the renewal
clause in its present form. Part III deals with the implications for the
three key parties: Hydro-Qu6bec as the buyer, CFLCo as the seller, and
Newfoundland as the resource owner. Crucially, those implications are
assessed in the context of the late 1960s, not with respect to current and
anticipated future electricity prices. Part IV is a brief overview of the
events following the end of negotiations and up to recent years.

4.
Philip Smith, Brinco: The Story of Churchill Falls, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1975) at
288.
5.
Economic Council of Canada, Newfoundland: From Dependency to Self-Reliance (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1980) at 121.
6. Forces: Revue de documentation iconomique,sociale et culturelle (No. 57-58, 1981-1982). See
p.41 and p.99 for references in English; corresponding references are provided in French elsewhere in
the same document. None provides any insight into the renewal clause's origins.
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I. The letter of intent
The precursor to the 1969 contract was a Letter of Intent that took many
years to achieve.
In 1949, Newfoundland became part of Canada, and Joseph
Smallwood, a leading proponent of that union, became the first provincial
premier. Smallwood, a colourful and controversial political personality,
would remain premier until his political defeat in 1971. During his tenure,
he sought to industrialize the province's under-developed economy in
order to catch up with the rest of Canada. 7 To that end, he sought outside
expertise and capital.
Hence, in 1952, in a quest for investors, Smallwood approached
leading British bankers and industrialists. That led to the formation of the
British Newfoundland Corporation, Brinco, which was incorporated under
Newfoundland law in 1953. It received extensive land and water rights on
the island of Newfoundland and in the Labrador region of the province.
One of Brinco's most significant assets was the hydro-electricity potential
of the waterfalls on the upper reaches of the Hamilton River, renamed the
Churchill River in 1965.
In 1958 Brinco established a federally incorporated subsidiary, the
Hamilton Falls Power Company (HFPCo), renamed CFLCo in 1965. At
Brinco's invitation, the Quebec-based Shawinigan Engineering Company
took up a 20% interest in HFPCo with the right to maintain that ownership
position if the corporation were to expand. Brinco retained the remaining
80%. Shawinigan's expertise in hydroelectric development and its prior
working relationship with Brinco were the bases for this partnership. The
water rights to the Hamilton Falls were transferred from Brinco to HFPCo,
and that corporate entity became the development mechanism.
1. Politicalimpediments
Developing the Hamilton Falls would involve considerable challenges.
Its magnitude and its distance from major markets-approximately 180
kilometres due east from the Quebec border and several hundred kilometres
further from there to large population centres-presented substantial
engineering and financial complexities. These technical problems were
compounded by two political factors, both of which involved Quebec.
The first political problem had to do with a boundary dispute that had
been settled decades prior to Newfoundland becoming a part of Canada
in 1949. It concerned the inland boundary on the Labrador Peninsula,
7.
For more on the Smallwood era see Richard J. Gwyn, Smallwood: the unlikely revolutionary
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968), and Peter Neary, "Party Politics in Newfoundland, 1949-71:
A Survey andAnalysis" (1971) 6:4 J. Can. Studies 3-14; and (1972) 7:1, 3-21.
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where Canada's and Newfoundland's claims overlapped. The government
of Canada, at the request of and with the participation of Quebec, and
the government of Newfoundland brought this question to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in London. In 1927 the Judicial Committee
ruled in favour of Newfoundland.' That ended the legal dispute. Yet, the
boundary remained a politically sensitive topic in Quebec.
The secondpolitical obstacle also involved territory. At times, HFPCo
explored the option of selling to consumers beyond Quebec. To do so would
entail transmission of electricity through Quebec. Under the Canadian
constitution, embodied at the time in the British North America Act 1867
and its subsequent amendments, provincial governments could not impede
interprovincial trade. Still, Quebec governments were opposed to any
attempt to transmit power over their territory. The political circumstances
in Quebec since the late 1950s were such that the federal government was
not anxious to confront Quebec over this matter.9
Occasionally, these territorial issues would flare up at the political
level, with accusations and counter-accusations between Smallwood and
the various Quebec premiers. It is fair to say that both Brinco/HFPCo
and Hydro-Qudbec officials generally sought to avoid these sensitive
matters but the political spats did at times impede progress in commercial
negotiations.
2. Early discussions
Brinco first approached Quebec about a purchase agreement in the
mid-1950s but talks were sporadic. New possibilities for a commercial
agreement arose in September 1962. The federal government announced
in its Throne Speech that it would allow long-term contracts for the export
of surplus power in order to expedite the development of major power
projects. This was important because huge projects, such as the Hamilton
Falls, required long-term "take or pay" contracts to support their financing.
Take-or-pay means that the buyer is obliged to pay for the contracted
quantity even if at times it did not use or take delivery of all of it. If longterm export contracts were permitted then HFPCo might find buyers in
the U.S. Alternatively, Hydro-Qudbec might be more inclined to make a
deal with HFPCo in the knowledge that it might be able to' sell any surplus
power in the U.S. At the time, some U.S. utilities, notably Consolidated
Edison, were expressing interest in importing power.
8.
In the matter of the boundary between the Dominionof Canadaand the Colony ofNewfoundland
in the LabradorPeninsula(London: William Clowes, 1927).
9.
J. L. Churchill, "Pragmatic Federalism: The Politics behind the 1969 Churchill Falls Contract"
(1999) 15:2 Newfoundland Studies 215-46.
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The prospects forbuilding on this impetus became severely complicated
following the December 29, 1962 announcement by the Quebec government
of its plan to nationalize all privately owned electricity utilities in that
province. While non-electrical subsidiaries of these businesses were
allowed to remain in private hands, the Quebec government insisted that
Shawinigan Engineering transfer its 20% holding in HFPCo to Shawinigan
Water and Power, its parent company and one slated for nationalization.
According to Fullerton, it was on the instructions of the Quebec premier,
Jean Lesage, that this takeover of 20% of HFPCo was done.' °
Premier Smallwood was outraged at Quebec's intentions. In a meeting
in mid-January 1963 with David Morgan-Grenville, an official of Brinco,
Smallwood threatened to nationalize Shawinigan Engineering's 20%
interest in HFPCo if "Mr. Lesage persisted in being difficult or showed
signs of planning to use these shares as a weapon to obstruct a Hamilton
development."'"
Despite the political animosity ignited by the Shawinigan matter,
Brinco was encouraged by a meeting held on January 29, 1963 between
Lesage and Brinco's chairman and chief executive officer H. Greville Smith.
Lesage informed Greville Smith of his great interest in Hamilton. 2
To inject more vigour into the search for a deal, Brinco appointed
Robert Winters of Rio Algom Mines, and already on Brinco's board of
directors, as its new chairman and chief executive officer in July 1963.3
Rio Algom itself was a Canadian subsidiary of the Rio Tinto Corporation,
a significant shareholder in Brinco. Additionally, Rio Algom bought shares
in Brinco and also purchased a minority ownership interest in HFPCo.
Winters concerned himself with two key tasks: making progress on
commercial negotiations and reducing the political friction.
As for a commercial agreement, in August, Brinco developed a twentytwo-clause draft proposal. 4 That draft, dated August 16, envisioned a
thirty-year term beginning in June 1968, the time at which Hydro-Qudbec

10. D. Fullerton, "Quebec, Labrador and Newfoundland," Forces: Revue de documentation
dconomique, sociale et culturelle (No. 57-58, 1981-1982) at 46.
11. Morgan-Grenville's notes; Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador [PANL],
Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 116, file: Premier of Quebec, 1963.
12. This prospect was reinforced in April 1963; in a letter dated April 7, 1964 to Premier Lesage,
Robert Winters, Greville Smith's successor, recalled that "In April 1963 Hydro-Qurbec expressed
serious interest in obtaining power from the Hamilton Falls and indicated to us that the first generators
would have to be in service by 1968." Library and Archives of Canada [LAC], CFLCo Papers, MG28,
III, vol. 37, file 2.04.003.
13. Smith, supra note 4 at 137.
14. LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol. 37, file 9.
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would begin taking power. There was also a brief renewal provision, which
stated:
Both HFPCo and Hydro-Quebec shall have the right to renew the
proposed contract for a further term of (25?) years from its expiry date,
upon terms and conditions then to be agreed.
Thus, from the very beginning of what can be considered the full-fledged
negotiations between HFPCo and Hydro-Qudbec there was a renewal
clause.
During the remainder of August, Brinco refined its proposal and
presented it to Yvon De Guise, a senior official of Hydro-Qudbec, at a
meeting on September 3. It was very similar to the August draft. It stated
HFPCo would develop the Hamilton Falls site and that energy production
would be up to 34 million megawatt hours per year. Most of the electricity,
approximately 32 million megawatt hours, would be sold to Hydro-Qudbec
on a take-or-pay basis at a yet-to-be-determined price. A significant portion
of the remainder constituted what would become known as the Twinco
block, and which was replacement power for the diversion of water to the
new development from a smaller nearby site that had been developed a
few years earlier by the Twin Falls Corporation, a subsidiary of HFPCo.
Provision was also made for possible recapture of a modest amount of the
sales to Hydro-Quebec for future Newfoundland needs. As for the term
of the contract, it would be "approximately 30 years" from the date of
the first availability of electrical energy. The renewal clause was slightly
clarified and read:
Both HFPCo and Hydro-Quebec shall have the right to renew the
proposed power contract for a further term of, say, 25 years from its
expiry date, upon such terms and conditions as to quantity and price as
may then be mutually agreed.
Over the next few weeks discussions continued and the proposal evolved
into a more substantial document, dated October 7, entitled "Basis for
Proposed Agreement between Hamilton Falls Power Corporation Limited
and the Quebec Hydro Electric Commission." That document retained the
wording of the renewal clause except that it specified twent" years rather
than twenty-five as previously.
Winters' second key task on taking charge of HFPCo was to facilitate
a reconciliation of the two premiers. One of the sensitive issues was
the Quebec take-over of Shawinigan Engineering's 20% interest. Lesage
wanted Jean-Claude Lessard, Hydro-Qudbec's president, to be appointed
to HFPC's board of directors. This, to Winters, introduced a conflict
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of interest. Winters recorded that, in a meeting with Lessard on July 2,
1963:
I suggested to Mr. Lessard that he might wish to seek legal advice as to
whether or not there is likely to be a substantial conflict of interest with
him being at the same time a representative of the. buyer and the seller
of power.' 5
On August 13, Winters met with Lesage and Lessard. According to his
record of the meeting, he pointed out the possible conflict of interest if
Hydro-Qudbec were to be on the Board of HFPCo while negotiating with
it for the purchase of electricity. To resolve that conflict of interest, Winters
suggested they consider selling back Quebec's 20% interest in HFPCo to
Brinco and offered a substantial premium. Winters's record indicates that
Lessard was impressed by the argument but that Lesage responded that
his legal and financial experts all advised that Hydro-Qudbec retain its
interest in HFPCo. Winters then outlined other options, such as allowing
Newfoundland to be an equity participant. Lesage asked him to formalize
his suggestions in writing, which he did.' 6
In a letter dated August 14, 1963 Winters repeated his concern about
"a serious conflict of interest developing when Hydro-Qudbec is party to
negotiations for both selling and buying the same power." He again offered
to purchase Quebec's shares at up to $20 each, .practically double what
the Quebec government had compelled Shawinigan to accept for them.
His letter also outlined shareholding possibilities that would incorporate
Newfoundland participation if Hydro-Qurbec were to retain an ownership
position in HFPCo.
By the end of 1963, Winters was able to find a compromise. Smallwood
agreed to take a 5% interest in HFPCo rather than achieve parity with
Hydro-Qudbec. Lesage agreed to allow the Hydro-Qurbec position to be
diluted to 15% and agreed that a Newfoundland royalty of 8% on Brinco's
pre-tax net income would be extended to all such income earned by
HPFCo, not just Brinco's share of it.'7 In return for the latter concession,
Brinco transferred some additional shares in HFPCo to Hydro-Qudbec.
The resulting ownership structure of HFPCo would be: 8
15. Memorandum accompanying letter from Robert Winters to A.W. Southam (5 July 1963), LAC,
CFLCo Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol. 37, file 7.
16. Notes of conversations on 13 August 1963 between Premier Jean Lesage, Mr. J. C. Lessard and
Mr. Winters. 14 August 1963, Toronto, LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol. 37, file 7.
17. See letter from Winters to Lesage, 3 December 1963, LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol.
37, file 2.04.003.
18. This allocation was not fully realized until Rio Algom took up its option to buy shares allocated
to it. According to Brinco's Annual Report for 1966 (at 8) Rio Algom did so in February 1967.
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Brinco

68.3%;

Hydro-Qudbec

16.3%;

Rio-Algom

10.4%;

Newfoundland

5.0%;

and, despite Winters's concerns over conflict of interest, Hydro-Qudbec
got its seat on the HFPCo Board. Jean-Claude Lessard took the position
on January 22, 1964. In June of the same year, following Newfoundland's
acquisition of its 5% interest, the chairman of the Newfoundland and
Labrador Power Commission, George Hobbs, also joined.
Thus, by the end of 1963 substantial progress had been made.
The question of ownership positions in HFPCo had been resolved and
commercial talks were well underway. HFPCo was making expenditure
commitments for 1964 in anticipation of a power-purchase agreement.
3. Difficult negotiations
As talks continued into 1964 more drafts of the "Basis" document were
prepared. All were similar in format and all retained a renewal clause based
on the notion of future mutual agreement. The March 30, 1964 draft's
renewal clause, which was unchanged from the October draft, was:
Both HFPCo and Hydro-Quebec shall have the right to renew the
proposed power contract for a further term of, say, 20 years from its
expiry date, upon such term and conditions as to quantity and price as
may then be mutually agreed.
The March 3 0th draft also provided for a thirty-five-year term rather than
thirty as in the original proposal and the October 7Th one, and it envisaged
first power in 1969. It continued to recognize that Hydro-Qudbec might resell some of the power to Consolidated Edison. To facilitate financing, it
also contained a provision under which Hydro-Qudbec's payments would
not be less than the amount needed by HFPCo to service its debt.
By this time, however, price became a major stumbling block. In a
letter to Robert Winters dated April 10, 1964, Hydro-Qudbec's Lessard
suggested a price of 2.0 mills. He also offered that Hydro-Qudbec
could provide a loan to HFPCo and buy more shares in HFPCo if this
offer adversely affected HFPCo's financing arrangements. This was
unacceptable to HFPCo. Winters pointed out, in a response letter dated
April 13, that all his previous suggestions regarding price were in the area
of 3 mills.
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Shortly thereafter, Hydro-Quebec struck a committee to examine
price and to discuss prospects with HFPCo. That committee had wanted
to convert HFPCo into a public corporation. However, recognizing that
the other shareholders did not want to sell their shares and Quebec's
inability to expropriate HFPCo, its report outlined what an agreement
acceptable to Hydro-Qudbec should entail. It suggested a price of 2.5
mills under a contract lasting thirty-five years from the first delivery of
energy. 19 Among its other recommendations, the committee also wanted
that Hydro-Qudbec's holdings in HFPCo be increased to 25% and that
HFPCo be required to have an office in Quebec so it could be liable to
Quebec income tax. Regarding renewal, the report suggested that HydroQudbec be given a preference for purchasing all the energy not required by
Newfoundland, at negotiated rates, when the contract expired.
On June 29, Winters met with Lesage. The former's record of the
meeting indicates that the conditions put forward remained too onerous.20
Winters pointed out that HFPCo's retained earnings over the life of the
contract would show deficits if the price were 2.65 mills or less. Lesage
suggested that the Quebec government might assist by undertaking to
guarantee any cost over-run. Winters sought more undertakings, namely:
" a price escalation scheme that allowed the price to change with
project cost;
*

an adjustment in price if the rate of return went below 6.5%; and

*

Quebec guarantees for HFPCo bank loans taken between the signing
of a letter of intent and the signing of a definitive power contract.

This sort of quid-pro-quo arrangement, namely a low-price regime in
return for undertakings to protect HFPCo from losses and to ensure that it
would be able to raise sufficient funds to complete the project, would turn
out to be a key characteristic of a subsequent Letter of Intent. However,
agreement on that Letter would take some time to reach. On July 8, in the
Quebec Legislature, Lesage announced that it was impossible to reach an
agreement at the time.
19. The report of the five-member committee was in the form of a letter dated 8 June 1964 to Lesage,
Lessard and the then Minister of Natural Resources, Rend Ldvesque. It is included in vol. I, tab 21 of
the record submitted on behalf of the second defendant-respondent, Hydro-Qudbec, formerly Quebec
Hydro-Electric Commission in Attorney General of Newfoundland v. Churchill Falls (Labrador)
CorporationLimited, Quebec Hydro-Electric Commission, Royal Trust Company and General Trust
of Canada (1983), 49 Nfld. & P.E.I.R 181, 145 A.P.R. 181, held at The Centre for Newfoundland
Studies, QEII Library, Memorial University.
20. See "Note of Meeting between Messrs. Lesage and Winters in the Prime Minister's Office
Quebec on June 29, 1964." LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, HI, 73, vol. 37, file 2.04.003.
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Following this breakdown, HFPCo considered transmitting power via
the so-called Anglo-Saxon route, one which Smallwood, frustrated with
Quebec, favoured. That route involved transmission of electricity from
the development site to the south coast of Labrador, connecting to the
Northern Peninsula of the island by subsea cables and continuing from
there with more subsea links to Nova Scotia. HFPCo concluded that this
much lengthier route to market was uneconomic. 2' As for passing through
Quebec, Lesage made it clear that he would never agree to it.22
In early 1965, Winters was considering his options. On January 5, he
wrote Smallwood that selling power to Hydro-Qudbec "at 2.75 mills, the
return to HFPCo and hence to the Brinco shareholders is not too exciting
a prospect." Brinco had calculated that 2.75 mills would yield a return of
6.8% on rate base, i.e., on invested capital, and that a price of 3.15 mills
would be needed to obtain a return of 7.5%.3
One way of improving the commercial outcome was to seek tax relief.
Thus Winters, in a letter to Smallwood dated February 3, 1965, raised the
idea that the federal government eliminate its corporation tax on privately
owned electricity generators. He also indicated that he would be exploring
the possibility of taking the power through Quebec rather than selling, it
24

there.

Regarding a return to formal negotiations on a sale agreement,
Winters and Lesage met to review their positions on April 24, when they
2
discussed ways to mitigate HFPCo's pricey.
These included: elimination
of federal corporate tax and Newfoundland provincial taxes, the use of
26
direct-current transmission, and a longer repayment period for bonds.
27
Lesage and Winters also discussed rapprochement with Smallwood.
A May 1, 1965 letter to Hydro-Qudbec from Winters re-ignited the
negotiations. It contained two proposals, A and B. If Hydro-Qudbec did

21. See "Review of pertinent considerations on alternatives for the development of Hamilton Falls
Power," 21 January 1965. LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol. 46, file 12.
22. "Memorandum of a Meeting between Premier Lesage and Messrs Bourget and Monast at the
Prime Minister's Office, on Thursday, 2 7 1 of August, 1964." LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG 28,111,73, vol.
37, file 2.04.003.
23. LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol. 37, file 9.
24. Archives and Manuscripts, QEII Library, Memorial University, Joseph R. Smallwood Papers,
collection 285, file 14.06.015.
25. LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol.37, file 2.04.003.
26. Letter from Winters to Smallwood (18 January 1965), Archives and Manuscripts, QEII Library,
Joseph R. Smallwood Papers, vol. 285, file 14.06.015. Up to then the bonds had been assumed to be
for twenty-five years.
27. Winters had even engaged Prime Minister Lester Pearson in his efforts to secure a deal and to
bring the two premiers into harmony; he wrote the Prime Minister a letter dated April 28 in this regard.
LAC, Lester Pearson Papers, MG 26, N3, vol..80, file 313.2.02.
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not want to purchase the power, Proposal A entailed the construction of
a transmission line across Quebec to markets elsewhere in Canada and
in the United States. Alternatively, Proposal B offered a sale agreement
to Hydro-Qudbec. Conditional on the previously discussed undertakings,
it suggested a forty-year contract at an average price of 2.55 mills and
committed to pass along any savings arising from any change in federal
corporate income tax. Also, there would be a formula to adjust the price in
relation to actual final cost. Before the end of the month, Hydro-Qudbec
and HFPCo were working on a draft Letter of Intent.
During this time, and despite Smallwood's preference for Proposal
A, Winters also had success in reconciling the two premiers. Indeed, on
June 7, Premier Smallwood wrote the Prime Minister confirming that an
understanding had been reached amongst Newfoundland, Quebec, HFPCo
and Hydro-Qurbec regarding development of the Churchill Falls. He
requested that the federal government eliminate the federal corporation tax
on private producers and distributors of electricity. To that end, in July the
federal government announced that it would increase its rebate to provincial
governments of federal corporate income tax paid by utilities from 50% to
95%. This higher rebate would be embodied in new legislation, namely,
the Public Utilities Income Tax Transfer Act (PUITTA).2 8 Newfoundland
could then, as agreed, give half of this enlarged rebate to HFPCo, which
would in turn pass it on to Hydro-Qudbec through the price.
On June 8, 1965 Hydro-Qudbec sent a draft Letter of Intent to Brinco.
This draft, which anticipated first power in 1970, was quite similar to the
"Basis" documents that had been discussed in late 1963 and early 1964.
However, it did incorporate a much longer term, namely forty-four years
from first power, rather than the thirty-five years of previous discussions
and four years more than Winters's most recent concessionary offer of forty
years. That was an enormous concession since it prolonged the low-price
regime. However, the document also reflected some of the undertakings
that Winters had sought, namely, an adjustment in price if capital costs
turned out to differ significantly from a specified estimate, and a provision
for Hydro-Qurbec to provide loan guarantees if the capital cost exceeded
the estimate. There was also a renewal clause, which stated:
Hydro-Quebec shall have the right to renew the proposed power contract

for a further term of years from its expiry date, upon such terms and
conditions as to quantity and price as may then be mutually agreed. It will
also be given right of first refusal prior to any contract that HFPCo may
28. S.C. 1966-67, c. 43. David B. Perry, Financingthe CanadianFederation,1867 to 1995: setting
the stagefor change (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1997) at 72.
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then be willing to sign with a third party other than Newfoundland.2 9
The significant addition to the renewal clause was Hydro-Qudbec's right
of first refusal but, crucially, the clause retained the commitment for future
negotiations on mutually agreeable quantities and prices. Nevertheless,
this provision was now substantially weakened indirectly. The extension
of the contract's term to forty-four years from the availability of first
power was much longer than the thirty-five years contemplated in earlier
negotiations. Renewal was thus pushed much further into the future.
4. Agreement
Still, another year of negotiations passed before the Letter of Intent was
finalized. Technical studies by Hydro-Qudbec and the resignation of
Winters in December of 1965 were among the reasons for the delays.
Henry Borden, who had been Chairman of the Board of Brinco, succeeded
Winters as president and chief executive officer of Brinco, while Donald
McParland took the presidency of HFPCo itself. It was also in 1965 that
the Hamilton River was renamed the Churchill, and consequently HFPCo
adopted its new name, CFLCo.
A Quebec provincial election was held in June of 1966, leading to a
further delay. Lesage's Liberals were defeated by the Union Nationale, and
the new premier, Daniel Johnson, wanted time to review the matter. By
September a new draft Letter of Intent had been formulated. Robert Boyd,
Hydro-Qudbec's general manager, strongly endorsed the agreement in a
letter to Hydro-Qudbec's commissioners. He highlighted several points of
advantage, notably the cost being lower than any other source available to
Hydro-Qu6bec, including nuclear energy. Boyd's letter went on to say
the purchase of energy from Churchill Falls would act as a life raft which
would allow Hydro-Qudbec to safely navigate the rough waters of system
growth which lie ahead."
On October 3, Hydro-Qudbec approved the Letter and on October 6 it
received government authorization. On October 13, Donald McParland
and C. T. Manning for CFLCo and Jean-Claude Lessard and Jean-Paul
Gignac for Hydro-Qudbec signed the agreement. On the Newfoundland
side, Smallwood had been increasingly frustrated by the delays and was

29. Record submitted on behalf of the second defendant-respondent, Hydro-Qudbec, formerly
Quebec Hydro-Electric Commission in Attorney General of Newfoundland v. Churchill Falls
(Labrador) CorporationLimited, Quebec Hydro-Electric Commission, Royal Trust Company and
General Trust of Canada (1983), 49 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 145 A.P.R. 181, held at The Centre for
Newfoundland Studies, QEII Library, Memorial University.
30. Ibid.
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threatening to send a letter to the Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, asking
that the project be declared in the national interest and for the federal
government to build a transmission line through Quebec.3 However, when
informed of the deal, he was delighted, writing "praise be to God" in his
diary.3 2 Also in October, Premier Johnson announced that a commission
would study and report on the boundary question, effectively decoupling
it from the power contract.3 With Smallwood's decision not to send his
letter and with Johnson's sidelining of the boundary issue, the significance
of these political matters faded.
The agreed Letter of Intent. now put the contract's term at either
forty-four years from first power or forty years from completion of the
last generating unit, whichever was longer. As for the renewal clause, its
wording was consistent with all prior drafts and now read:
Hydro-Qudbec shall have the right to renew the definitive power contract
for a further term of years from its expiry date, upon such terms and
conditions as to quantity and price as may then be mutually agreed. It will
also be given the right of first refusal prior to any contract that CFLCo
may then be willing to sign with a third party for power consumption
within Quebec.34
The Letter of Intent represented a compromise between the approaches of
the two negotiating parties and reflected the basic quid pro quo arising from
the discussions between Winters and Lesage in April and May of 1965.
On the one hand, Hydro-Qudbec would be obtaining a very large amount
of power, approximately 32 million megawatt hours annually, under a very
attractive price regime. The price would be approximately 2.6 mills during
construction and, thereafter, fall in stages until it was slightly less than 2.3
mills for the last fifteen years of the term of the contract. These prices
were tied to the capital cost so if the facility cost less than anticipated then
the savings would be passed on to Hydro-Qudbec through a downward
adjustment in price. Moreover, CFLCo had acceded to a much longer
contract term during which the low-price arrangements would apply.
On the other hand, CFLCo received some important undertakings that
were intended to assist it in raising sufficient funds to complete the project

31. Smallwood obtained cabinet approval to appeal to the federal government under Order-inCouncil 661- 66, September 13, 1966.
32. Archives and Manuscripts, QEII Library, Memorial University, Smallwood Papers, col. 285, file
1.10.006.
33. The commission concluded that there was no judicial basis for challenging the boundary; see H.
Dorion Rapport de la Commission d'ttude sur l'Inigrit6du Territoiredu Quibec, vol. 3.2 (Quebec,
1971) at 12.
34. LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, IH, vol. 107, file 7.'
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and to ensure that it could remain solvent during the term of the contract.
The Letter provided for adjustments in the price if the capital cost turned
out to be higher than estimated or if the interest costs were higher than
then contemplated. The exchange-rate risk-most of the financing would
be borrowed in the U.S.-would be shared. Also, Hydro-Qudbec wouldeither guarantee, or provide, a loan if there was a capital cost over-run
and CFLCo could not otherwise obtain the necessary funds to complete
the project. This arrangement as it evolved would become known as the
completion guarantee.
In short, the quid pro quo was a long-term low-price regime by CFLCo
in exchange for Hydro-Qudbec's undertakings to take or share various
risks. Both parties recognized that it was in their mutual interest that the
project be completed and at no time had there been any disagreement over
the renewal provisions.
With the comprehensiveness of the Letter of Intent and the dissipation
of the interprovincial political difficulties, it might have seemed that
reaching a definitive power contract would be a straightforward task. Not
SO.
II. Contract negotiations
Following the signing of the Letter of Intent on October 13, CFLCo
immediately went into action. According to its Annual Report (p.6) for
1966, within thirty days construction crews had returned to the site and
were at work.
By March 1967, CFLCo envisaged a schedule that would lead to a
power contract by October 31 of that year. 35 For CFLCo the key negotiator
was Donald McParland. Typically during the negotiations, McParland was
accompanied by Eric Lambert, vice-president (finance), C. T. Manning,
vice-president (legal), and John Tennant, a Montreal lawyer. Hydro 7
Quebec's key negotiators included Robert Boyd and Yvon de Guise, as
well as other members of senior management and legal advisors. At a
late stage, Jean-Paul Cardinal and Marcel Lajeunesse, representing the
36
government of Quebec, joined the discussions.

35. John Tennant's "Memorandum of CFLCo Meeting of March 10, 1967." PANL, Newfoundland
and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.170.
36. Smith, supra note 4 at 287, states that they entered the discussions at the request of Quebec
premier Daniel Johnson. By January or February 1968 they were actively involved in negotiations.
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1. Brinco financial challenges
To meet Hydro-Qudbec's requirement for first power, which was now
1972, CFLCo had undertaken a substantial expenditure program for 1967.
While no disagreements had developed, by the spring of 1967 CFLCo
was anticipating that reaching an agreement on the power contract would
take longer than initially expected. Therefore, major financing for the
project would not be in place until June 1968; the success of the financing
plan depended on an agreement on a definitive contract. CFLCo would
have to find enough new funds to last until then.
By June 1967, a document entitled "Interim Financing: The Problems
and a Suggested Solution" had been developed by CFLCo's Eric Lambert.
It recorded that as of March 31, 1967, CFLCo had already spent $20.5
million on the project, which was then anticipated to cost between $750
and $800 million. CFLCo had a $10 million line of credit with the Bank
of Montreal to cover anticipated expenditures from April to June 1967.
To cover July 1967 to June 1968, it needed an additional $45 million. The
plan was thus to raise $37.5 million in a September share issue in CFLCo.
A $5 million extension of the line of credit with the Bank of Montreal
would be sought to cover expenditures until that month. Lambert's
document anticipated that the $37.5 million would then provide CFLCo
with enough funds to repay the Bank and cover its requirements until
January or February 1968, after which time interim bank financing could
be relied upon until June. It was also envisaged that Brinco would not
purchase any of these new shares. Its financial situation was tight and it
needed funds for other commitments. Therefore, the new CFLCo shares
would be sold through a public offering. Assuming that the other three
shareholders-Hydro-Qudbec, Rio Algom, and Newfoundland-held
their relative positions, Brinco's ownership in CFLCo would fall to
approximately 40%. It intended to maintain that position when a second
issue of shares, planned as part of the overall financing package, was
forthcoming in June.
CFLCo's planned public offering failed. The issue was abruptly
cancelled in October. According to a letter issued to its shareholders
on October 31, 1967, Brinco informed them that "Owing to market
conditions,...CFLCo will not proceed with the public issue." To save
the situation, Brinco had to hurriedly seek the cooperation of the other
three shareholders to subscribe for these shares on a pro-rata basis. This
meant that Brinco, reflecting its 68.2% stake in CFLCo at the time, would
have to take approximately $25.5 million of $37.5 million. To do so, it
arranged a $21 million line of credit with the Bank of Montreal for which
it had to pledge its shares in CFLCo and in Brinex, its mining subsidiary.
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Even then, it could not maintain its position. It sold some of its CFLCo
shares to the Newfoundland government. As a result of these and related
transactions, the direct ownership interests in CFLCo became:37
Brinco

63.3%;

Hydro-Qudbec

16.3%;

Rio Algom

10.4%;

Newfoundland

10.0%.

Remarkably, Hydro-Qudbec also owned a 2.04% interest in Brinco; thus
3
giving it a further indirect interest in CFLCo. 1
Not only did its ownership position in CFLCo decline but, contrary
to plan, Brinco was now saddled with an additional $21 million in bank
debt. Brinco's financial position became such that in the following months
Donald Gordon, its president and chief executive officer, approached one
of its founding shareholders, Rio Tinto-Zinc, forrescue. 39 As of June 1967,
Rio Tinto-Zinc's direct ownership of 4.16% of Brinco likely made it one of
the largest single shareholders; and this was reinforced by a further 6.04%
owned by Rio Algom.4 ° Brinco was originally owned by a small number of
investors but by 1965 was listed on the Montreal Stock Exchange and had
a large number of shareholders. While negotiations between CFLCo and
Hydro-Qudbec edged forward in 1968, there were parallel complex and
confidential financial discussions undertaken by Brinco, Rio Tinto-Zinc
and potential investors aimed at addressing Brinco's precarious finances.
2. Negotiations to January 1968
Despite its much weakened financial situation, by the end of October 1967
Brinco did have good reasons to be optimistic about CFLCo's prospects.
Hydro-Qu6bec would need all the power from Churchill Falls so a resale agreement with Consolidated Edison or other third parties was no
longer required. With the October share issue, sufficient funds had been
injected to cover anticipated spending until the early months of 1968.
Also, given Hydro-Qudbec's desire for new power by 1972, there was less
37. Brinco Annual Report 1967, at 4 and 10, and "Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited:
Equity Financing and Advances" October 20, 1967, LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol. 62, file
15.
38. "Interim Financing: The Problems and a Suggested Solution," June 3, 1967, at 9. LAC, CFLCo
Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol. 62, file 7.
39. Joseph Schull, The Great Scot: a biography of Donald Gordon, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1979) at 260.
40. "Interim Financing," supra note 38.
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time available for it to switch to alternative sources, and its willingness
to participate in.the share issue was a sign that it wanted Churchill Falls
to proceed.
Also, progress had been made on the contract and no severe difficulties
had arisen. By early July, a Power Contract Format had been exchanged
between the two parties. Following a request from Hydro-Qudbec in
August, it was agreed that one more generating unit would be installed,
bringing the total to eleven. The resulting estimated additional cost was put
at $28 million at the time, which would of course increase funds required
in the major financing arrangements. On the renewal clause, both sides
agreed that a longer notice period of at least five years was desirable. This
was not a contentious issue; for Hydro-Qudbec it would allow time to find
in CFLCo's case
an alternate source of power if there was no renewal and
41
market.
alternative
an
find
to
time
more
it would give
By early September of 1967, CFLCo deemed it necessary to have a
final agreement in the near future and set October 15 as the target date.42
A first draft contract was exchanged, followed by an October 6 hdraft. As
had been the case since the 1963 proposal, both contained a renewal clause.
That renewal clause remained consistent with the original meaning of the
1963 proposal as well as the 1966 Letter of Intent and all the discussions
to date. The first paragraph of that draft's renewal clause was:
Hydro-Qurbec shall have the right to renew this Power Contract for
such further term and upon such terms and conditions as to quantity and
price as the parties may agree. Should Hydro-Qurbec wish to renew
this Power Contract, it shall notify CFLCo in writing at least 10 years
prior to the expiry of the term hereof of its willingness to renew and
the parties shall thereupon negotiate and agree upon the term of such
renewal as well as upon the terms and conditions as to quantity and
price applicable for such renewal. If the parties agree on a further term
of years as well as on the terms and conditions as to quantity and price
applicable to renewal; such agreement shall be evidenced by a notice
given by one party and accepted by the other, setting out the further
term and the terms and conditions as to quantity and price mutually
agreed upon and the receipt by one party of such notice duly accepted
by the other shall automatically renew the Power Contract for the further
term and upon such terms and conditions as to quantity and price as
determined in the said accepted notice.43

41. "C.T. Manning's Record of meeting of Power Contract drafting committee of May 2, 1967"
PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.163(D).
42. "Minutes of a Meeting held in the Board Room on September 5, 1967," dated 7 September 1967.
PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.170(D).
43. Ibid.
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That paragraph was followed by one that elaborated on Hydro-Qudbec's
right of first-refusal for sales in Quebec should the parties not succeed in
negotiating a mutually acceptable renewal.
By late October, CFLCo considered time to be of the essence and
was then aiming to have the contract "completed by November 30, 1967
subject only to lenders' requirements."" More drafts followed, including
ones dated October 27, November 3 and November 13. Despite CFLCo's
November 30 th target, negotiations continued. However, in an internal
memorandum dated December 5, 1967, CFLCo's McParland wrote
"Progress to date suggests that the Power Contract is moving into its final
stages."
During the next month, negotiations continued and three more drafts
were prepared. In early January of 1968 it was agreed at internal CFLCo
meetings that "all efforts should be directed towards achieving a high
measure of agreement on the power contract by 31 January. '45 An agenda
prepared by CFLCo for a January 12 meeting noted that "Using February
1, 1968, as a commencement date, a timetable should be drawn up for the
completion of the Bond Offering Memorandum, and the finalization of its
support material."
CFLCo's efforts produced a draft dated January 15, 1968. Consistent
with earlier versions, it contained numerous clarifications and there were
editing changes but the substance was intact. The renewal clause also
remained but, following a practice that started with the December 21 draft,
it was divided into two sections, one devoted to renewal itself and the
other to first refusal. The substance of the renewal section was unchanged
except that it now stated that if parties failed to reach a renewal agreement
at least eight years prior to the expiry of the contract then Hydro-Qudbec's
right to renewal would lapse.
Two other important articles of the January 15th draft deserve mention
because of their relevance to subsequent developments. One was the
article entitled "Completion Guarantee." It had its origins with the Quebec
undertaking to guarantee or provide loans to CFLCo if the final cost of the
project exceeded an agreed estimate. Its lineage can be traced back to the
offer by Premier Lesage to Winters at their June 29, 1965 meeting, and it

44. Eric Lambert's "Notes for Meeting to be held Tuesday, October 24, 1967" dated 23 October
1967. PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.163(D).
45. "CTM's record of meetings relating to the Power Contract 3 and 4 January 1968." PANL,
Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.170(D). Note that "CTM"
refers to C. T. Manning.
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was embodied in Clause 25 of the Letter of Intent.4 6 Such loans or loan
guarantees, if ever needed, would now be conditional on CFLCo having
first raised a minimum of $700 million in financing, rather than being
conditional on the cost exceeding $700 million as had been previously
used as the benchmark.
The second important article was entitled "Debt Service Requirement
and Expense Charges." Its origins can be traced back to the take-or-pay
provisions as discussed late in 1963 and early 1964. It was also reflected
in Clause 24.0 of the Letter of Intent, as well as Clause 5D of the draft
of October 6. It had now evolved to the point where if payments made
to CFLCo, on a take-or-pay basis, were not sufficient to cover its debt
service and expense charges then Hydro-Qudbec would advance loans to
cover the gap.
3. The events of February1968
Following the January 15 draft, negotiations continued into February.
On February 13, the CFLCo Board met. The minutes of that meeting,
which had to be obtained by a freedom-of-information request to CFLCo,
provide important information on the situation. According to those
minutes, McParland reported:
A draft contract had been delivered to Hydro-Qurbec and counsel
for the Government at the end of December, followed on January 15th
by a draft representing more fully the conditions relative to financing as
presently foreseen by the Company's local and U.S. financial advisors. It
was hoped that discussion with Government representatives on this last
contract
draft would take place shortly and that a mutually satisfactory
47
could be submitted for Board Approval in the near future.
Hydro-Qudbec's Jean-Claude Lessard attended this meeting in his capacity
as a CFLCo board member. There is nothing in the minutes of the meeting
to indicate any disagreement from him regarding McParland's optimistic
prediction of an imminent contract.
Yet, quite astonishingly, the minutes of the meeting indicate that Mr.
Lessard did inquire whether the January 15th draft represented CFLCo's
"maximum conditions." According to the minutes, the board chair, Donald
Gordon, responded that the January 151h draft represented the conditions
that CFLCo's financial advisors felt investors would insist upon.
46. This Completion Guarantee article first appeared in the December 21, 1966 draft. Prior to that,
it had been intended that such a guarantee not be embodied in the contract but dealt with separately;
see Annotation to the October 6, 1967 draft contract.
47. Minutes of the 56' meeting of the board of directors of Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation
Limited, 13 February 1968. CFLCo file #ATIP-2005-0004 at 4.
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Later in the same meeting, the Board was informed by Gordon that its
cash position would be $14 million at the end of February, that accounts
payable were running at $5 million monthly, that $1.2 million would be
left by the end of May, and that the cost of cancellation was estimated
at $5 million. The implication was that CFLCo had only enough funds
to last another two to three months. However, this impending shortage
of funds was not presented in a way that raised fears. Gordon pointed
out that he anticipated that bridge financing of approximately $10 million
would be readily arranged with the bank if satisfactory progress on the
power contract and major financing could be demonstrated. He went on
to suggest that with the arrangements being made for the financing plan
and in anticipation of more progress, a planned meeting with the bank at
the end of March would lead to the necessary access to funds. Apparently,
the $10 million was anticipated as sufficient to maintain the project until
funds from major financing were in place.
In short, the tone of the meeting was positive. From CFLCo's
perspective a contract would be approved in the near future, and, while
funds were running out rapidly, the bank would provide bridge funding to
last until major financing was in place. Progress on both the contract and
the financing plan was dependent on Hydro-Qurbec.
There is no indication from the minutes that this impending shortage
of funds, nor the fact that Lessard was being made aware of it, nor his
question regarding CFLCo's terms, raised any concerns at the board
meeting. Perhaps any misgivings about a Hydro-Qurbec official being on
the CFLCo board and having access to such information had dissipated.
After all, the Letter of Intent had been signed, there had been no serious
disagreement in the negotiations to date, and there was a positive and
48
cooperative relationship between McParland and Hydro-Qudbec officials.
Also, as a substantial shareholder with representation on the CFLCo board,
Hydro-Quebec presumably had a responsibility for CFLCo's interests.
As it turned out, however, this February meeting was both an
extraordinary and a pivotal event. It was extraordinary because it explicitly
demonstrated the extent to which Hydro-Qu6bec had access to CFLCo,
both in terms of governance and information. These circumstances are
reminiscent of the problem raised repeatedly by Robert Winters years
earlier and led him to suggest to Lessard to seek legal advice as to whether
there would be a substantial conflict of interest. The Hydro-Qurbec
president was participating as a CFLCo board member in a board meeting
48. Smith, supra note 4 at 231-232 points out that when McParland took over negotiations, he
quickly established a strong rapport with Hydro-Qudbec officials.
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dealing with the contract and even inquired as to CFLCo's flexibility on
its conditions. He was also learning first-hand of CFLCo's approaching
cash crunch. The meeting was pivotal because practically immediately
afterward, Hydro-Qudbec sought substantial new concessions and was
able to secure them over the following eight to ten weeks, after which
time the final parameters of the contract and related arrangements were
effectively settled.
At a meeting on February 14, just one day after the board meeting,
Hydro-Qudbec informed CFLCo that it was preparing its own draft of the
contract. That Hydro-Qudbec draft, dated February 18, 1968, was submitted
to CFLCo's McParland under a covering letter from Robert Boyd stating
that this draft was to serve as a basis for further discussion. Ominously, it
also indicated that more changes to the draft would be forthcoming.49

Hydro-Qudbec's February 18 draft itself sought a significant new
concession. It provided that new shares in CFLCo be attached to any loans
advanced to CFLCo by Hydro-Qudbec under the Completion Guarantee
article (Article V of that draft). If the article were ever triggered, HydroQuebec, under this draft's section 5.4, would receive debentures that were
convertible into shares and, if the total amount advanced was more than
$110 million, would also receive bonus common shares in CFLCo at a
rate of 1 per $500 advanced. The previously agreed quid pro quo had
been a long-term and low-price regime in exchange for assurances of such
advances if they were needed, which would be repaid with interest. Now,
Hydro-Qudbec was proposing to change the arrangement so that it could
obtain a larger ownership position as well.
Still, the renewal provision was little changed from CFLCo's January
draft, and the substance remained as it had been since the proposal of
September 1963. It read:.
Hydro-Qudbec shall be entitled to renew this Power Contract for
such further term and upon such terms and conditions as to quantity and
price as the parties may agree. Should Hydro-Qudbec wish to renew this
Power Contract it shall notify CFLCo in writing at least 10 years prior
to the expiry of the term hereof of its willingness to renew. The parties
shall thereupon negotiate the term of such renewal and the terms and
condition as to quantity and price applicable to such renewal, including
provisions, if any, for further renewal. If the parties are able to agree
to renewal at least eight years prior to the expiry of the term hereof, a
renewal agreement shall thereupon be executed between them. If the
49. Letter from Boyd to McParland (23 February 1968), PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro
Corporation records, box 115, file 500.170(D).
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parties fail to agree upon renewal within the aforesaid time limit, HydroQudbec's right to renew shall thereupon lapse. 0
This would soon change.
4. A priceformulafor renewal
The first evidence that any change in the renewal clause was being
contemplated is in the form of two pages of handwritten notes. The
existence of these notes, which were found by the authors uncatalogued in
CFLCo's archived records, was, apparently, not previously known. They
shed new light on CFLCo's reaction to Hydro-Qu6bec's attempts to alter
radically the terms for renewal. They are reproduced in Appendix I.
These two pages were in C.T. Manning's writing and his initials
appear at the top right-hand corner of the first page and the date of 262.68 appears on the top left-hand corner of the same page. They record
a working-through of the issues associated with specifying a fixed price
during the renewal period. They do not appear to be from a meeting
because other hand-written notes by him typically list the names of those
in attendance, and there are no references to other persons.
The notes start by identifying the problem, namely, how the contract
could be extended for an additional ten to twenty-five years at a fixed
mill rate. They indicate that this would avoid criticism from proponents of
nuclear power. Next, the notes turn to the Water Power Lease, i.e., the lease
from Newfoundland under which CFLCo had access to the Churchill Falls
watershed. Under a 1967 statutory amendment to the lease, the provincial
government, having successfully lobbied the federal government to
increase the rebate of federal corporate income taxes on private utilities,
would turn over the increased rebate to CFLCo.5' The purpose of this was
to support the low-price regime for Hydro-Qurbec. The lease, as amended
in 1967, provided for this rebate for the term of the power contract, which
the lease anticipated as approximately 40 years. It explicitly excluded
the rebate continuing for any renewal period. Hence, Manning's concern.
Also, under the lease, it was only for the term of the contract that CFLCo
was sheltered from a number of provincial and municipal taxes as well as
from any new such taxes, fees royalties etc., and from increases in rates of
applicable taxes.

50. PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.170(D).
51. More precisely, the 1967 ChurchillFalls (Labrador)CorporationLimited (Lease) (Amendment)
Act, 1966-67, S.N. 1966-67, no. 84, stipulated that 47.9% of all funds collected through federal taxes
on CFLCo's income and rebated to the provincial government would then be turned over to CFLCo
for the term of the contract.
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On the top of the second page of his notes, Manning concludes that
granting Hydro-Qudbec an option to extend the term of the contract may
be "the right out" provided that the price is on a formula basis. That
formula would have to build in compensation to CFLCo for the loss of
the PUITTA rebate and for covering the replacement cost of plant and
equipment, and to avoid prejudicing an agreed return on equity.
In the last part of his notes, Manning turns to the issue of how to change
the Power Contract's provisions to incorporate a fixed price for the renewal
period. The notes indicate that the forty-year term had been established
on the basis of the reasonable foreseeable life of the plant without having
to undertake major capital replacements. To consider lengthening the
contract, the notes continue, there would have to be an engineering study
to ascertain which components would last and which would have to be
replaced or substantially repaired. Based on that information, and with
a return-to-equity concept, Manning concludes it should be possible to
project a flat mill rate with escalation for the loss of the PUITTA rebate
and for additional capital costs. He also raises a concern about whether
the risk would be too great to accept without anescalator for operating
costs. He then lists the 8% rental and the "H.P. tax." The former is the
8% "rental" imposed by the Newfoundland government under CFLCo's
lease, and which applied to CFLCo's pre-income-tax profits. The latter
is the horsepower royalty of 50-cents per horsepower year. Presumably,
Manning was noting that these would also have to be included in a
formula-based price for the extension period. Finally, on the last line of
his notes, Manning simply writes "Defeats purpose."
Manning's notes constitute an attempt to think through what would be
required if CFLCo were to agree to a fixed price for the renewal period.
His conclusion is that, rather than a fixed price, there would have to be a
price formula that would reflect:
" the cost of major capital replacements and repairs;
" the loss of the PUITTA rebate to CFLCo;
* the escalation in operating costs, including the loss of shielding
from provincial taxation;
*

the Lease's rental and horsepower royalty; and

*

an agreed return on equity.

As it turned out, such a formula did not become the basis for renewal.
Hydro-Qudbec sought a concession that allowed for none of the above.
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5. The "do-or-die condition"
On Wednesday, February 28, the negotiators met to discuss HydroQudbec's draft of February 18. According to Manning's record of this
meeting, several sections of that draft were discussed and a number of
points agreed. 2 CFLCo pointed out that elements of the Completion
Guarantee Article, notably the provisions by which Hydro-Qudbec would
obtain shares if it were called on to make advances, were completely new
and required detailed analysis. It was agreed that CFLCo would draft riders
representing the points that were discussed and that they would meet again
With Hydro-Qu6bec on Friday. Manning's record described the meeting as
cordial and noted that the Quebec government representatives "indicated
a real desire in completing the contract as soon as possible." Renewal was
not raised at the meeting.
On Friday, March 1, Hydro-Qudbec's Robert Boyd and his group,
together with Marcel Lajeunesse representing the Quebec government,
met with CFLCo's McParland, Lambert, Tennant and Manning for further
negotiations. Several issues were discussed and it was at this time that
a major change in the renewal provision was put on the table by HydroQu6bec. On this matter, Manning's record is:
Mr. Boyd pointed out that an extension of the term to Hydro-Quebec
would have the same significance to them as the completion guarantee
had to CFLCo, and he thought that Hydro should be given an option to
renew flat at 2.2 mills per kilowatthour for 25 years or that an extension
of the term for 25 years at this rate should be built-in to the contract. We
explained the problems which this created, particularly in relation to the
tax rebate and the consequent necessity for amendment to the existing
statutory lease. This was a political consideration. There were also
practical considerations, such as what escalation of wages we would be
faced with 40 years after 1976 and what replacements of plant would be
required during such an extension, notwithstanding the delicate political
and practical considerations. We indicated sympathy with Hydro's
request. 3
Despite the diplomatic tone of the last sentence, Manning's hand-written
notes taken at the same meeting, and reproduced in Appendix II, reveal
something else. Those notes, like those reproduced in Appendix I, were
located uncatalogued in CFLCo's archived records and their contents were
not previously known.

.52. "CTM's record of meeting with Hydro-Qudbec 28.2.68 at their offices," PANL, Newfoundland
and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.163(D).
53. Ibid.
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Interestingly, these notes start with the "query" on renewing for a
lesser amount of power at a reduced rate, which foreshadow a CFLCo
attempt to obtain a less onerous renewal clause. The notes also reflect
the considerations listed in Manning's February 26 analysis, such as the
cost of replacement of capital, escalation of operating costs, and loss
of the PUITTA rebate. They also indicate that CFLCo was reluctant to
open the issue with Newfoundland; the "issue" appears to be the PUITTA
rebate specifically. The most telling element of Manning's notes is his
characterization of Hydro-Qudbec's demand as
"A Do or Die Condition."
This request to replace the renewal clause came at a time when CFLCo
had about twelve weeks of funds left and further financing was dependent
on a deal being at hand. Moreover, this was an entirely new development.
From the initial 1963 proposal and its subsequent drafts to the drafts of
the Letter of Intent, the Letter of Intent itself, and persistently through all
the numerous drafts of the power contract, including the one of February
1968, which Hydro-Qudbec itself had prepared, the substance of the
renewal provisions had remained the same. Following the expiry of the
contract's term-the length of which had been extended to a minimum of
forty-four years as part of the 1965 breakthrough in negotiations-there
was to be mutual agreement on price and quantity for the renewal and
Hydro-Qudbec would have a right of first refusal for sales for consumption
in Quebec. Throughout the years of negotiations there was no indication
of any desire of either party to deviate substantially from those agreed
points.
Boyd's statement intimated a linkage between this change in
the renewal and the Completion Guarantee. However, a completion
guarantee had been part of the long-agreed quid pro quo. The parties had
agreed that the contract would be extended from thirty-five years to fortyfour years from first power under the low-price regime in exchange for
Hydro-Qufbec's various undertakings. Hydro-Qudbec had only in the
previous month requested that it be additionally compensated, through
more CFLCo shares, if it were ever to be called on for any advances
under the completion guarantee. Now, it was seeking an additional and
extraordinary concession for which there would be no reciprocation.
There were no allowances for the items listed in Manning's considerations
of February 26. This demand was a complete departure from the renewal
provisions in the Letter of Intent. It was on the basis of the Letter of Intent
that CFLCo had launched its major construction program in order to meet

234

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Hydro-Qudbec's schedule for first power. Those efforts had practically
exhausted CFLCo's access to funds by the time this demand was put forth
as a "do-or-die condition."
Following this meeting, CFLCo continued to work toward finalizing
both the'contract and a financing plan. On March 5, McParland wrote a
memorandum to Boyd, forwarding revised drafts of sections dealing with
the Completion Guarantee and related items. On March 6, there was another
meeting between CFLCo and Hydro-Qudbec and the Quebec government
representatives. According to Manning's record of that meeting, a number
of riders, which had been submitted to Hydro-Qurbec the previous day,
were agreed. 5 They also reviewed a list of provisions that still needed
to be settled, including renewal. CFLCo representatives stated that it
was under advisement but progress was being made and that CFLCo's
response would be coming as soon as possible. Later in the meeting, JeanPaul Cardinal, representing the Quebec government, suggested that the
principal points still open were the definition of the Final Capital Cost of
the Plant, the Completion Guarantee, and Renewal. However, he offered'
no additional comment on renewal and only made a brief remark as to
what should be included in the definition of the Final Capital Cost. Most
of the remaining discussions related to the Completion Guarantee.
CFLCo's response to the Hydro-Qudbec new position on renewal
was contained in an internal memorandum, dated March 7, 1968, which
listed fifteen items that "appear to be required to complete the contract."
The counteroffer on renewal, known as rider 34, was attached to that
memorandum. The key elements of rider 34 read:
This Power Contract shall be renewed, on the basis stated in this
Section, for a further term of 25 years from the expiry'date hereof.
Renewal of this Power Contract shall be evidenced by a new contract
which shall provide as follows and be in the form and terms approved of
by counsel for each of the parties respectively:(a) sale and purchase of energy under such new contract shall be
on a continuous energy basis, whereby, up to the limit of the number
of kilowatthours per year which shall constitute, at the date of expiry
hereof, the Annual Energy Base, Hydro-Qudbec shall pay for all energy
made available to it by CFLCo, whether or not taken;
(b) the price payable by Hydro-Qurbec shall be payable in lawful
money of Canada and the rate per kilowatthour applicable shall be the
equivalent in Canadian dollars of 2.0 mills in U.S. funds[.]"
54. See "CTM's record of meeting with Hydro-Qudbec 6.3.68," at 2. PANL, Newfoundland and
Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.163(D).
55. PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.170(D).
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This compromise proposal offered a fixed price of two mills in U.S.
currency, which was approximately equal to the 2.2 mills in Canadian
funds at the time. That was a very low price, even in 1968. However, the
rider offered CFLCo some scope to protect itself. First, the renewal terms
were to be approved of by counsel. Secondly, a new contract would have
to be drawn up and signed. Thirdly, and most importantly, provision (a)
states that Hydro-Quebec would buy, up to a limit, all the electricity made
available by CFLCo. That provisioncontained no floor on the amount
that CFLCo could choose to make available to Hydro-Qudbec, only an
upper limit, namely the Annual Energy Base, which the draft contract put
at 31.5 million megawatt hours.16 The implication of this wording is that
if CFLCo could sell some, or even all, of its power to another party then it
would be able to do so. In short, while Hydro-Qudbec would have a fixed
price of U.S. 2.0 mills for the 25-year period, CFLCo would at least retain
the flexibility of choosing what quantity of power to sell to Hydro-Qudbec
at that price. This attempt to determine the amount of power to be sold
to Hydro-Qurbec at the reduced price was consistent with the "query" in
Manning's handwritten notes of March 1 which refers to the possibility of
renewing for a lesser amount of power. (see Appendix II)
On March 11, the parties met again. Most of the meeting dealt with
matters related to financing. CFLCo pressed Hydro-Qudbec to lower the
$700 million threshold, as provided for in the draft contract's Article V,
that CFLCo had to raise to qualify for the completion guarantee. CFLCo
wanted it lowered to $600 million, arguing for a time-phased approach
which would allow CFLCo in the initial instance to raise a smaller amount
of funds through bond sales. Then, if need be, it could go to the financial
markets later to raise any additional funds in a second bond offering.
According to the CFLCo side, this would put Hydro-Qudbec in a position
where it would not have to put up any cash except if the second offering
of bonds could not be successfully marketed and, even if that happened,
it would not be until 1971 or 1972. CFLCo felt that such a time-phased
offering would be easier to sell and would likely have more reasonable
terms. Hydro-Qu~bec's Boyd responded that any reduction in the $700
million threshold was unacceptable. At that point, the CFLCo side pointed
out that profitability had been "stripped down to the underwear" and that
CFLCo "were in no position to give any further concessions." 5 7

56. The contract allowed for modest adjustment of this figure at eight and later four-year intervals.
57. See "CTM's record of meeting with Hydro-Qudbec 11.3.68 - 2:30 p.m." PANL, Newfoundland
and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.163(D).
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The meeting then turned to the concession that Hydro-Qudbec was
seeking on renewal. CFLCo's rider was tabled. Manning summarized the
ensuing discussion as follows:
Mr. McParland then dealt with the contract renewal and tabled a
proposed revision to clause 3.2 which became numbered as rider 34. He
pointed out that this suggestion had not received board approval; that
management was prepared to support it but that it was still fraught with
certain problems. Lajeunesse raised the question as to whether Hydro
wanted a firm renewal or an option to renew, and it was decided that
this should be considered by Hydro. McParland explained the reasons
for the pricing arrangement and our fear of the effects of devaluation.
Lajeunesse thought that it was probably preferable to append the renewal
contract to the Power Contract and have it executed concurrently with
the signature of the principal contract. 8
Thus, the CFLCo negotiators made the point that even its compromise
proposal on renewal was "fraught with certain problems" but management
would support it.
Towards the conclusion of the meeting, the other Quebec government
representative, Jean-Paul Cardinal, indicated that a report to the Quebec
government was past due and that he wished to see the contract finalized
that week. The parties then ended the meeting by agreeing on several
actions to be taken, including a commitment by Hydro-Qudbec to "indicate
their agreement on riders 29 to 34 inclusive as soon as possible," rider 34
being CFLCo's proposed compromise on renewal.
On March 14, the parties representing Hydro-Qudbec, CFLCo, and
the Quebec government met again. At the beginning of the meeting,
CFLCo wanted to deal with the outstanding riders, namely riders 29 to 34.
However, Lajeunesse indicated that his side had not had an opportunity
to deal fully with them, and suggested that the meeting deal with various
aspects of Article V - Completion Guarantee, and Article XII - Debt
Service Requirement and Expenses Charges. Then the meeting turned
to a number of .Hydro-Qudbec's proposed riders to the February 18 th
draft. None appeared to be particularly contentious. Interestingly, part
way through the meeting, Cardinal reiterated that he hoped that a contract.
would be before the Quebec cabinet by Monday, March 18, just four days
away. 59
At the end of the meeting, the two parties agreed that the principal
matters remaining for resolution were Articles V and XII. In that context,

58. PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.163(D).
59. See "CTM's record of meeting with Hydro-Qudbec 14.3.68 - 2:30 p.m.," ibid.
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CFLCo indicated that they had sent the Hydro-Qudbec draft to their
financial advisors and New York counsel. Also, CFLCo indicated that
meetings with them would be arranged early the next week, i.e., the week
of March 18, and invited Hydro-Qudbec to have their counsel participate
in those meetings. The implication was that an agreement would not be
possible by March 18, as Cardinal had hoped. Still, it appears that the
parties were moving rapidly towards one, and there was still no sign that
CFLCo's rider on renewal was not acceptable.
In the next few weeks, with CFLCo's funds dwindling, events moved
quickly both in terms of the contract and the financial plan. Hydro-Qudbec
also became more extensively involved in the latter.
6. The financialarrangements
The fundamentals of the financing plan were largely in place by April.
Realization of that plan depended on a power contract agreement and on
meeting conditions put forth by Hydro-Qudbec. In a letter dated April 23,
1968 to CFLCo, Robert Boyd laid out the financial conditions required
by Hydro-Qudbec. These conditions were external to the power contract
but Hydro-Qudbec's recommendation to the Quebec government to
authorize the contract was conditional on them. The main elements may
be summarized as follows.
*

New Equity: Hydro-Qudbec wanted to increase its ownership
position in CFLCo. 6 It was agreed that $25 million in new CFLCo
shares would be issued in order to fund work later in the year.
Existing shareholders would subscribe for them in batches over
the summer months. Hydro-Quebec would take $15 million of
these shares so it could bring its overall ownership in CFLCo up to
25.7%.

*

General Mortgage Bonds: As part of the financing plan, CFLCo
would offer $100 million in general mortgage bonds, with ten
bonus shares in CFLCo attached to each $1000, solely to its
four shareholders in accordance with their respective ownership
positions. The other three shareholders would have thirty days to
subscribe, after which Hydro-Quebec would take any units that had
been declined as well as take its respective share. (Later in 1968,
Hydro-Qudbec changed the conditions under which CFLCo would
offer these bonds so as to give CFLCo the option to require HydroQuebec to take them exclusively.)

60. See Minutes of joint meeting of the executive committees of the boards of directors of Brinco
and CFLCo, April 10, 1968; obtained under CFLCo ATIP request 2005-0004.
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"

CFLCo to raise $515 million: As a condition on the General
Mortgage Bond arrangements, CFLCo had to agree to first obtain
commitments, by a specified deadline, of at least $515 million
from investors, of which at least $415 million would haveto be for
First Mortgage Bonds.6 (This requirement was later included as a
condition in Voting Trust Agreement No. 1.)

*

By-law 13: Hydro-Quebec required that the CFLCo Board of
Directors approve a new by-law. By-Law 13 would require approval
by those holding at least 75% of CFLCo shares for certain decisions
to be made. For instance, without 75% approval, CFLCo could
not engage in other projects, incur debt for purposes unrelated to
the project and its operation, increase the authorized share capital,
or amend or repeal the by-law itself. With Hydro-Qudbec to hold
25.7% by year's end, this would give it a veto over such matters.

a

Voting Trust Agreement: An agreement was to be drawn up between
Brinco and Hydro-Qudbec by which a sufficient number of Brinco's
CFLCo shares would be deposited with a trust company so that those
shares plus those of Hydro-Qudbec would total 50.1%. if CFLCo
were to fail to pass or later rescind by-law 13, or if it were to violate
other specified conditions then the trust company would vote those
shares in accordance with Hydro-Qudbec's wishes. This would
allow Hydro-Qurbec to replace the majority of the CFLCo board
with individuals of its choosing. The Voting Trust Agreement would
also direct the trust company to sell the deposited CFLCo shares
to Hydro-Qurbec, giving it majority ownership, if CFLCo failed to
meet certain financial conditions. (Later in 1968 this evolved into
two agreements - Voting Trust Agreement No. 1 and Voting Trust
Agreement No. 2).

The implications of agreeing to these terms were far-reaching for
CFLCo. It would have to act to satisfy them before the end of 1968. If
it succeeded then Hydro-Qudbec's ownership position would increase to
a minimum of 25.7% and Hydro-Qudbec would obtain a significant veto
power under by-law 13. If it failed to meet these financial conditions
in time then, via the Voting Trust agreements, management control and
majority ownership could pass from Brinco to Hydro-Qudbec. For CFLCo
and Brinco, there could be no turning back.
7. Defacto end of negotiations
By early April the form of the contract was alsoreaching its final stages. It
is also clear that CFLCo's rider 34 had been a firuitless effort.

61. This requirement did not obviate the requirement that CFLCo raise at least $700 million in
financing as the threshold amount needed to qualify for the completion guarantee.
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On April 10, 1968, when CFLCo was close to exhausting its available
funds, the executive committees of the CFLCo and Brinco boards held
a joint meeting. CFLCo's executive committee consisted of McParland
as well as six others who were also members of Brinco's executive
committee. The latter committee also included M.F. Nicholson, Brinco's
general manager, and Maurice Bourget, a Quebec Liberal Senator.
At that time, they considered the points on which Hydro-Qudbec was
insisting. According to the minutes of the meeting, CFLCo's McParland
presented Hydro-Qudbec's demand on renewal as follows:
Hydro-Qudbec wished to be able to project a lower mill rate than the
present draft of the contract permitted. Due to increased costs and
escalation the effect of the present term of 44 years from first delivery or
40 years from completion indicated an average mill rate considerably in
excess of that contemplated in 1966. Accordingly, they had requested a
25 year extension of the contract on a flat mill rate basis suggested at two
mills per kilowatt hour. They wished this to be in the form of an option.
This would produce a gross revenue of $60-65 million per annum.
There would be no debt outstanding. Should CFLCo attempt to qualify
the rate by the addition of escalators or make any provision for its tax
position, the purpose of the extension would be defeated. Although the
Churchil [sic] project was marginally more attractive then [sic] nuclear
power today, it was conceivable that it would not be in 40 years' time.
It was obvious that a commitment on the extension was preferable to an
option and it also appeared desirable to endeavour to have the mill rate
expressed in either U.S. or Canadian funds at the option of CFLCo in
order to afford the
greatest protection against serious devaluation of the
62
Canadian dollar.
This synopsis is revealing in a number of ways. First, McParland pointed
out that costs and therefore the mill rate would be higher for HydroQuebec than anticipated in 1966, but does not acknowledge that this
was generally true for costs of its alternate sites. Secondly, he failed to
mention rider 34 or the related problems that Manning had identified,
e.g., escalating operating costs, loss of tax concessions and the need for
capital replacements, except to the extent he stated that any attempt to
include escalators or the loss of tax concessions would defeat the purpose.
On this point, he did not even address the question of whether two mills
would even be sufficient for CFLCo to remain solvent during the renewal
period. Thirdly, when he raised the spectre of nuclear power costs, his
assessment was inconsistent with studies completed for CFLCo just two

62. Minutes of a joint meeting of the executive committees of the boards of directors of Brinco and
CFLCo, 10 April 1968, CFLCo file #ATIP 2005-0004 at 5.
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months earlier. One report had reviewed the nuclear alternatives and had
forecast that Canadian heavy water reactors would have generating costs
of about four mills by the 1970s. 63 Another report observed that the life
of a nuclear power plant, which had substantial capital costs, was thirty
years, much less than a hydropower plant. That same report also noted
that plants under construction in Ontario were expected to have generating
costs of approximately 3.9 mills while one under construction at Gentilly
in Quebec would have a generating cost of 4.75 mills. 64 Neither report
ventured to make projections beyond the 1980s, let alone suggested that
the nominal cost of nuclear power would be two mills or less after the year
2016. Indeed, had Hydro-Qurbec believed that nuclear power was going
to be that cheap then it would have been in its interest to retain the original
renewal clause. That way, at renewal time, it could seek an even lower
price! Finally, McParland's presentation did not mention what he and all
present knew, namely, that without an agreement within weeks CFLCo
would be unable to pay its bills.
It appears that, having failed to convince Hydro-Qudbec to accept
rider 34, McParland turned to the Brinco/CFLCo Executive Committees
to give in, which they did. The joint meeting authorized conclusion of the
negotiations, directing McParland to agree to Hydro-Qurbec's demands
but with efforts to negotiate modifications in CFLCo's interests where
possible.
The next complete draft contract was dated April 19, the first one since
the February 18 11version. It included a number of concessions by CFLCo.
This draft's Article V, the completion guarantee, provided that not only
would CFLCo have to repay, with interest, any advances made to it by
Hydro-Qudbec but it would have to issue and turn over ten new shares for
each $1,000 advanced. This draft also extended the shares-for-advances
principle to Article XII. 65 As for renewal, the key terms were as follows:
This Power Contract shall be renewed on the basis stated in this
Section, for a further term of 25 years from the expiry date hereof.
The renewed Power Contract, on the basis of a sale and purchase of
continuous energy whereby a number of kilowatt hours per year equal
63. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited and Acres Canadian Bechtel of Churchill Falls,
"Review of Current Nuclear Power Economics," Final Mock-up, February 12, 1968, p.44. LAC,
CFLCo Papers, MG28, Il1, 73, vol. 105, file 11.
64. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation "Draft Outline of Government Brief," p. VIII-7, draft
of February 8, 1968, prepared by Wood Gundy. LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, Ill, 73, vol. 61, file
700.013.
65. If CFLCo were to ever call on Hydro-Qudbec under Article XII, the latter would receive either
five shares per $1000 advanced or ten shares per $1000 in the event that the plant was destroyed.
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to that which shall constitute, at the date of expiry hereof, the Annual
Energy Base, shall be made available by CFLCo to Hydro-Qudbec and
the latter shall pay for it, whether taken or not, at a price of 2.0 mills per
kilowatt hour payable monthly.
During the period of renewal the terms, clauses and conditions of
such renewal shall be those set forth in the present Section and Schedule
III hereof, which shall apply automatically without any further signature

being required.66

None of the elements of CFLCo's attempted compromise, rider 34, had
been incorporated. This new renewal section compelled CFLCo to sell
essentially all the power from the plant at a price fixed at just two mills
starting approximately fifty years in the future and continuing for twentyfive years thereafter. There was no consideration of any of the allowances
that Manning had listed in his February 26 analysis. Even the final efforts
to obtain an option to have the price payable in either U.S. or Canadian
currency failed. This apparently ended the matter.
In a letter dated April 23, Robert Boyd of Hydro-Qudbec sent drafts
of the financial arrangements, the Voting Trust Agreement, and By-law
13 to CFLCo.67 His letter stated that, conditional on CFLCo's acceptance
of those documents, Hydro-Qudbec was prepared to recommend the
draft contract to the Quebec government. Two more drafts followed in
April, dated April 25 and April 29. They contained small changes and
clarifications with no more substantial concessions. Thus, before the
end of April 1968, negotiations had effectively ended. CFLCo had made
several concessions and it had completely capitulated to Hydro-Qurbec's
demand regarding renewal.
On May 14, the executive committee of CFLCo and of Brinco held
another joint meeting. Those present voted to authorize CFLCo to enter
an agreement substantially in the form of the April 29 t" draft and to agree
68
to the related financial conditions.
On June 13, 1968 the Board of Directors of CFLCo met. It was their
first meeting since February 14 when McParland had been optimistic about
a deal being at hand. This meeting occurred when CFLCo effectively
had no money. Around this time, CFLCo was sending staff with signing
authority out of the office in order to have an excuse not to pay bills.69

66. PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.163(D).
67. PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.163.1.
68. Minutes of a joint meeting of the executive committees of the boards of directors of Brinco and
CFLCo, 14 May 1968, CFLCo file #ATIP 2005-0004 at 10 and 11.
69. Smith, supranote 4 at 289.
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The board consisted of fourteen members, including the seven who
were on the executive committee. Information was provided to the board
members in summary form in a confidential memorandum that was
distributed at the meeting and had to be returned at the end of the meeting.
Both the minutes and the memorandum had to be obtained by a freedomof-information request to CFLCo. Specifically, according to Minute 386
of this meeting,
To avoid reading at length the minutes of the Executive Committee
Meeting of April 10 and May 14, 1968 which had been held jointly with
the Brinco Executive Committee Meeting, a memorandum summarizing
the actions taken by the Executive Committee at these meetings was
distributed to the Directors present. In view of their confidential nature
the Chairman requested that each Director return his copy of the
memorandum at the close of the Meeting.
The memorandum was then
7
read by Mr. Manning to the meeting.
The eight-page memorandum devoted six lines to renewal, informing
readers that it was to be in the form of a firm commitment at a flat rate of
two mills in Canadian dollars. It also presented brief summaries of other
important items, such as the voting trust arrangements.
Board members in attendance, including Hydro-Qudbec's JeanClaude Lessard and the chairman of the Newfoundland and Labrador
Power Commission George Hobbs, approved all the actions taken by the
executive committee as summarized in the memorandum. The Board then
specifically ratified and confirmed the executive committee's decision
taken at its May 14t" meeting to enter into a power contract substantially in
the form of the draft of April 29.
In sum, the agreement on the draft contract was presented to the
board of directors as a fait accompli. They received only a memorandum
summarizing the decisions already taken and were asked to endorse them.
The draft contract itself was not circulated and directors were not permitted
to keep the memorandum. At the time, CFLCo had effectively exhausted
all its available financial resources and no further funds could be obtained
without an announcement of agreement.
III. Implications of the renewal clause
In 2007 a price of two mills a kilowatt hour, which is equivalent to $2
a megawatt hour, is an unbelievably low price. A contract that sets that
price for twenty-five years starting in late 2016 is barely conceivable. The

70. Minutes of the 5 8 1 meeting of the board of directors of CFLCo, 13 June 1968, CFLCo file
#ATIP-2005-004 at 2.
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resulting gain, or economic rent, that will accrue to Hydro-Qudbec is the
difference between what the electricity will be worth to Hydro-Qudbec
and what it will pay to CFLCo for it. A rough back-of-the-envelope
calculation implies that the gain could have a net present value, i.e., be
equivalent to a lump-sum payment in 2007, in the range of $5 billion to
$30 billion.7' This range is based on heuristic assumptions and, at best,
should be treated as impressionistic.
What is more relevant to the issues at hand, are parties' assessments
of the implications of the renewal clause at the time, 1968. That is the
purpose of this section, starting with Quebec.
1. Quebec
In the first week of June 1968 Hydro-Qudbec adopted a resolution
approving the draft power contract subject to the approval of the Quebec
government. By this time, a draft of the contract dated May 20, 1968 had
superceded the April 29 draft and was basically a cleaned-up version of
it.
In a letter dated June 6, 1968, Hydro-Qudbec then made its formal
recommendation to Quebec Premier Daniel Johnson to accept the
agreement. That letter, written by Jean-Claude Lessard, presented a
synopsis of the main considerations that justified its recommendation:
*

investment expenditures by Hydro-Qurbec would be reduced;

" annual operating costs would be lower when compared to the
alternatives;
*

the cost of energy would be lower than the alternatives;

*

there would be work for Quebec manufacturers and contractors;
and

*

Hydro-Qurbec would own a minimum of 25.7% of CFLCo.

Regarding the renewal clause, Lessard's letter states:
The Letter of Intent between Hydro-Qurbec and CFLCo signed in
1966 called for a 40-year contract with the possibility of renewal at a
rate to be discussed before 2005.

71. Both figures are based on sales of 29 million megawatt hours annually. The lower figure is
based on the assumption that a megawatt is worth $40 to Hydro-Qudbec in 2007, with that amount
growing at a rate of one percent more than the general rate of inflation, and the resulting annual gains
are subject to a real discount rate often percent. The higher figure starts with $55 a megawatt hours,
assumes a 3.5 percent increase above the inflation rate and uses a 5 percent discount rate. The figures
given in the text are the rounded totals following from this procedure.
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In the attached agreement, Hydro-Qudbec has an automatic renewal
for a period of 25 years at a rate of 2.0 mills/kWh without escalation.
This is a considerable improvement over the Letter of Intent when it
is noted that a difference of 1.0 mill kWh represents a saving of about
$30,000,000 per year.72

Lessard's letter concluded that the agreement was to "Hydro-Qudbec's
greatest advantage." Several supporting documents were enclosed with
Lessard's letter, including a Hydro-Qudbec report entitled "Hydro-Qudbec
Construction Program;" dated April 19, 1968. This report compared three
alternatives for adding to the utility's electricity capacity from 1968 to
1980. Those options were the "Churchill Falls program," the "thermalnuclear program" and the "thermal program." The two main criteria by
which these programs were ranked were initial construction cost and
annual cost. The latter included interest, depreciation, operation and
maintenance in addition to fuel for nuclear and thermal units and the
cost of purchased power. The Churchill Falls program was ranked first
and the thermal-nuclear program second. The Churchill Falls program
itself covered 1968 to 1980 and was a mix of the purchase of power from
Churchill Falls beginning in 1972 and the building of additional capacity
in Quebec to become available beginning at various times from 1977 to
1980. For this program, the annual cost of electricity for the years 1980
to 2015 was estimated at 5.35 mills but the Churchill Falls' component of
this average was put at 4.70 mills, inclusive of transmission line costs in
Quebec. Thus, Churchill Falls was also superior to the set of remaining
components of the Churchill Falls program.
In addition, the Hydro-Qu6bec report identified the post-2015 gains
associated with the new renewal clause. It stated that:
The extension of this contract for another 25 years, at a price of 2.0
mills/kwh, not subject to cost escalation, offers benefits for HydroQudbec. In the first place, Hydro-Qurbec would not be obliged to plan
for the construction of power stations in 2015 to replace Churchill Falls
power. This investment would be pushed forward to the end for the
25-year period, around 2040. Secondly, for every 1 mill/kwh difference

72. Record submitted on behalf of the second defendant-respondent, Hydro-Qudbec, formerly
Quebec Hydro-Electric Commission, in the Supreme Court ofNewfoundland Court ofAppeal between:
Her Majesty's Attorney General of Newfoundland, Plaintiff-Appellant and Churchill Falls (Labrador)
Corporation Limited, first Defendant-Respondent and Quebec-Hydro Electric commission, second
Defendant-Respondent and the Royal Trust Company, third Defendant-Respondent and General Trust
of Canada, fourth Defendant-Respondent) (Evidence submitted in Attorney Generalof Newfoundland
v. ChurchillFalls (Labrador)CorporationLimited, Quebec Hydro-ElectricCommission, Royal Trust
Company and General Trust of Canada(1983), 49 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 145 A.P.R. 181, held at The
Centre for Newfoundland Studies, QEII Library, Memorial University.
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. between the cost price of energy from another source and the purchase
price of 2.0 mills/kwh, Hydro-Qurbec earns $29 000 000 per year for
the 25 years, or $725 000 000. 71
The Construction Program report did not speculate on how large that mill
difference might be over the renewal period. However, a difference of
just eight mills would translate into almost a quarter of a billion dollars
per year to Hydro-Qurbec's advantage.
Another document, also enclosed with Lessard's letter, compared
the draft contract agreement with the 1966 Letter of Intent. It echoed
the conclusions of Hydro-Qurbec's Construction Program report. This
comparison document noted that the cost of the project would be higher
than anticipated in the Letter of Intent. In part this was due to the addition
of an eleventh turbine but also due to financial market conditions, which
made it more difficult for CFLCo to obtain funds and made interest rates
higher. It also stated that potential first-mortgage bondholders required
that Hydro-Qudbec's advances/loan guarantees not be limited to the $109
million provided for in the Letter of Intent. Nevertheless, it opined that:
In view of the fact that the costs of the project and of borrowing money
have increased since the date of the Letter of Intent, facts which are
beyond the control of either CFLCo or Hydro-Qudbec and as applicable
to the CFLCo project as to any other, we believe that the draft agreement
and accompanying documents as submitted contain assured advantages
compared to what was provided by the Letter of
for Hydro-Quebec
74
Intent.

It then listed those advantages over the Letter of Intent. The renewal clause
was identified as one of them and it was noted that:
The rate of 2.0 mills is very low in itself and considering the way in
which the purchasing power of money has declined since the beginning
of the century, it is an extremely advantageous rate for Hydro-Qudbec,
even at this time.75
In short, in 1968, based on its own assessment, Hydro-Qudbec would
have expected, without any anticipation of the oil-price shocks and high
inflation of the 1970s, that the gains to it resulting from the new renewal
clause would be extremely advantageous for the twenty-five years in
question.

73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
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2. CFLCo
The implications of the new renewal clause for CFLCo, assessed from a
1968 perspective, would have been unfavourable. Hydro-Qu6bec could be
expected to take approximately 29 to 30 billion kilowatt hours annually
during the renewal period; this amount anticipates that CFLCo will have
recalled its allowed maximum of 2.4 billion kilowatt hours for use within
the province. At a price of two mills, Hydro-Qudbec would be paying
CFLCo approximately $58 to $60 million annually during renewal.
Assessed from the perspective of 1968, it would have been very unlikely
that this revenue would be sufficient to cover costs.
Plant operating costs and corporate expense alone would be considerable
that far into the future. CFLCo's own forecasts in 1968 anticipated that
in 1977, plant and corporate expense would be $7.8 million and would
escalate by 3% annually.76 The table below illustrates that, using that
escalation rate, the cumulative effect over such a long period of time is
quite substantial. It would mean that during the renewal period these costs
would average $37 million annually and therefore would alone consume
more than 60% of the $58 to $60 million that Hydro-Qurbec would pay
to CFLCo. The table also illustrates the sensitivity of such projections to
small increases in the escalation rate. A rate of 4% or more would imply
that these costs could actually exceed the payments made by HydroQuebec.
Escalation Rate Average annual Plant and Corporate Expenses
from 1977

during the Renewal Period: 2017-2041

3.0%

$37.0 million

4.0%

$62.2 million

In the context of the times, namely mid-1968, a 3% escalation rate for
future costs appears to have been the norm. However, the length of time
into the future-approximately fifty to seventy-five years-would likely
have reduced the comfort level associated with the use of any escalation
rate, especially in circumstances where revenue would be largely fixed.
Manning's notes of February 1968 well anticipated this uncertainty. (see
Appendix I) His notes contained a remark to the effect that CFLCo would
have to consider whether or not the risk associated with rising operating
costs would be too great to accept without an escalator.
76. CFLCo ledger sheets, dated July 22, 1968 have projections of plant and corporate expenses
based on an escalation rate of 3%. LAC, CFLCo papers, MG28, 111, 73, vol. 107, file 4.
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Even if operating costs did not fully exceed revenues, there would still
be other costs to consider. Plant, equipment and other structures would
tend to wear out and need replacement over time. By the beginning of the
renewal period, components of the powerhouse, reservoir, transmission
lines and other structures, other than those that may have been already
replaced, would be between forty and fifty years old. With the further
aging of the physical plant, there would be a considerable likelihood that
major components would have to be replaced during the renewal period.
Again, Manning's notes anticipated this need; those notes indicated that for
the forty years following completion, replacements of major components
were not anticipated but that an engineering study would be needed to
consider replacements after fifty or sixty years. To illustrate, allowing for
2.5% escalation in nominal capital costs starting from 1976, a capital item
would cost three times more in 2021 than in 1976 and 2021 would be just
five years into the renewal period. To the extent that capital replacements
were needed, CFLCo would have to devote its revenues to financing them,
either directly or by servicing debt incurred to pay for them.
Additional costs would also come into play. CFLCo, under its 99year water-rights lease, was obliged to pay a horsepower royalty to the
Newfoundland government in the fixed amount of approximately $2.6
million annually. Tax relief, in the form of exemptions from sales and
fuel taxes as well as from increases in other taxes and from new taxes, that
had been provided by the provincial government, did not extend to the
renewal period. Even if CFLCo managed to make any profit during some
years of the renewal period, the PUITTA rebate will have expired so those
profits would be subject to the full federal corporate income tax rate.
There was a further risk at play for the other shareholders in CFLCo. If,
as provided for under Articles V and XII, CFLCo ever had to seek advances
from Hydro-Qudbec then in addition to having to repay Hydro-Qudbec, it
would have to provide new shares to Hydro-Qudbec. That would result in
the dilution of any returns due to the other shareholders. The provisions
for advances were in the contract largely to assure bondholders that their
investments were safe rather than to be actually acted upon. Still, this was
a risk that the other CFLCo shareholders had to bear.
Considering rates of cost escalation as anticipated in the 1968 context,
the very likely need for major capital replacements after 2016 and the
loss of tax advantages, the equity shareholders of CFLCo would have.
had little prospect of earning any positive return during the renewal
period. In acquiescing to Hydro-Qu6bec's do-or-die condition, CFLCo's
management would have understood that during the twenty-five-yearrenewal CFLCo shareholders would likely suffer losses or, at best, barely
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cover costs. In 1968, two mills was likely the lowest conceivable price at
which CFLCo could be expected to cover costs during the renewal period,
if that. In other words, all the economic rent from the project, i.e., the
difference between its market value and the cost of producing it, would
accrue to Hydro-Quebec.
Without a future amendment to the two-mill twenty-five-year renewal
clause, CFLCo would have no opportunity whatsoever to share in any
increase in the market value of the electricity taken by Hydro-Qu6bec.
The fact that, following its failed attempt to obtain less onerous renewal
terms, CFLCo accepted the new renewal clause attests to CFLCo's and
Brinco's assessment of the credibility of Hydro-Qudbec's ultimatum of
March 1, 1968, one perceived by senior CFLCo management as a "do or
die condition." It had come at a time when CFLCo was close to exhausting
its cash and when Brinco was in no position to help. Brinco itself was in
the midst of a financial crisis brought on by having to borrow over $20
million from the Bank of Montreal to support the CFLCo share issue of
October 1967. Without an agreement on the contract, CFLCo would have
no options left other than the "die" one.
3. Newfoundland
The implications of the renewal condition for Newfoundland, as resource
owner, were largely the same as those for CFLCo. The main mechanism
by which Newfoundland would share in the economic rent was through an
8% rental on CFLCo's pre-tax profit. With little or no prospect that CFLCo
would make any profit during the renewal period, that 8% would yield
little or no revenue. By the same reasoning, the provincial corporation
income tax would yield little or no revenue. During renewal, CFLCo would
no longer be entitled to a share of the provincial government's PUITTA
rebate but, without CFLCo earning any profit, that also would be of little
or no value to the province. The only revenue of which Newfoundland
could be relatively certain was the horsepower royalty revenue, which had
been established in the statutory water power lease with CFLCo. It was a
fixed amount of approximately $2.6 million per year and was based on the
amount of power generated.
Thus, it was most unlikely that Newfoundland's royalty and tax
revenue from Churchill Falls would be more than a few million dollars
per year during the renewal period. Even that would be at risk if CFLCo's
revenues could not cover other costs. That compares dramatically with
Hydro-Qudbec's own anticipation of earning between $29 and $30 million
per year for each mill difference between the cost of alternative sources
and two mills.
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As with the Letter of Intent, the Newfoundland government was not
party to the contract negotiations. It was via a telephone call from CFLCo's
board chairman, Donald Gordon, that Premier Smallwood first learned
that the renewal clause had been replaced. Gordon, who was also Brinco's
president and chief executive officer, called on Friday, July 12, two days
after the Quebec government authorized Hydro-Qudbec to proceed with
finalization of the deal. July 12 was also the same day that Hydro-Quebec
issued its press release announcing the decision to proceed with the project
and including reference to the new renewal clause. Gordon kept a record
of his telephone conversation with Smallwood. Apparently, this record,
like Manning's notes in the appendices, had not been uncovered until this
research was undertaken. Its text, which uses Smallwood's initials, J.S.,
is as follows:
I called at exactly 10.00 a.m.
I said I was calling to confirm that the Order-in-Council authorizing
Hydro Quebec to execute the power contract had been received and that
Hydro Quebec was making a press release this morning. I gave him a
summary of it.
I also read Mr. McParland's statement to the Press.
J.S. expressed his gratification and congratulations. He asked about
the actual signing of the Contract and I repeated that this would be
forthcoming as soon as financing had been arranged and told him the
Bond Memorandum was actively in hand through Morgan Stanley. I
said I could not give any firm date until we have the report by Morgan
Stanley but I estimated this might be around end of September. I asked
J.S. not to use this date and he said he quite understood.
I said there was one special point mentioned in the Hydro Quebec
announcement, namely the extension of the Power Contract for 25 years
at a fixed price of two mills. His first reaction was that this looked like
pretty cheap power. I reminded him that the Letter of Intent gave Hydro
Quebec the right to renew and that all things considered we felt it to be
a good deal to have the terms settled now. Moreover, by the end of the
forty year contract the property should be debt free and its operating
costs at minimal levels. Hydro Quebec had asked for an option to renew
at the price mentioned but we had negotiated for a firm commitment as
being in our best interests. J.S. said this was a matter ofjudgment and he
had no further comment. He seemed quite relaxed. 7

77. See "Notes ofTelephone Conversation with JR. Smallwood, Premier ofNewfoundland on 12 July
1968." PANL, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation records, box 115, file 500.170(D).
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This record is revealing.
Only after Smallwood expressed his
congratulations on the deal did Gordon mention renewal, and it was the
only issue he raised.
When told of the renewal, Smallwood's remark about the renewal
price of two mills constituting "pretty cheap power" shows that he had
an appreciation of the implications. Gordon's response to Smallwood
that the Letter of Intent gave Hydro-Qurbec the right to renew was highly
misleading. The Letter's renewal clause provided for negotiations -for
mutually satisfactory terms on price, quantity, and other conditions. That
renewal clause had been public knowledge since the October 1966 press
release announcing the agreement on the Letter of Intent. Its substance
had been retained in all the drafts up to March 1968.
Also, Gordon's remark to Smallwood that by the end of the fortyyear contract costs would be minimal and the project debt free was
either dishonest or misinformed. Manning's notes of February 1968 had
anticipated the need for an escalator for operating costs and for adjustments
for major capital replacements as well as other considerations. CFLCo's
own cost projections at the time used a 3% escalation rate and had placed
annual operating costs at the beginning of the renewal period at more than
$25 million.78
Gordon's final observation on the telephone conversation, namely that
Smallwood "seemed quite relaxed," is open to interpretation. The news
of the deal and the new renewal clause had been presented to Smallwood
as a fait accompli. The press releases were being made public. In the
preceding weeks, Smallwood had agreed that Newfoundland subscribe
for 10% of the forthcoming $25 million share issue in CFLCo, and had
arranged budget funding for it at the end of June. Over the preceding two
years, legislation had been passed or amended by his government that
made needed adjustments in CFLCo's Lease, that gave relief to CFLCo
from provincial sales taxes, and that provided for the transfer of the half
the province's PUITTA rebate to CFLCo so it could give a lower price
to Hydro-Qudbec.7 9 Earlier, Smallwood himself had successfully lobbied
the federal government to increase the rebate to enable this transfer to
take place. As far back as the 1950s it had been appeals by Smallwood
to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the Rothschild merchant

78. Ledger sheets, dated July 22, 1968, from CFLCo archives. LAC, MG28, In, vol. 107, file 4.
79. The ChurchillFalls (Labrador)CorporationLimited (Lease) (Amendment) Act, 1966-67, S.N.
1966-67, no. 84, exempted CFLCo from the provincial retail sales tax and gasoline tax, and from any
increase in existing provincial taxes and from any new taxes during the term of the contract.

The Origins of a Coming Crisis:
Renewal of the Churchill Falls Contract

251

bankers and other leading British industrialists and financiers that led to
the formation of Brinco.
While Smallwood had an inkling of the implications of renewal, he
did not pursue the matter. Apparently, neither did any other provincial
politician or policy-maker at the time even though newspapers reported
that Quebec had gained concessions and mentioned the renewal provision
and the price of two mills.' ° Smallwood himself had relatively little to say
about the deal over the next few months. Questions could not be asked
about it in the provincial legislature as its session was over. There was a
call from the editorial page of The Evening Telegram, one of the two major
newspapers in the province at the time, for more information on the deal
and for a re-opening of the legislature to debate the matter."' That did not
happen.
Whether Smallwood thought of intervening after the telephone call
from Gordon is not known. If he -had, there was little that could be done
because on Monday, July 15, 1968,just aweekend since Gordon's telephone
call on the preceding Friday, Brinco signed Voting Trust Agreement No.
1 as required by Hydro-Qurbec. With that, short of Hydro-Qu6bec taking
control of CFLCo's board and possibly obtaining majority ownership,
there could be no going back.
4. Some questions
Thus, as far as the two contracting parties were concerned, both understood
the implications ofthe renewal clause at the time. Hydro-Qurbec recognized
that two mills was an extremely advantageous price even in 1968 and that
it was below the cost of any existing alternatives. CFLCo's management
understood the perils of agreeing to such a low fixed price so far in the
future with no safeguards.
The severity of that bargain, combined with the conflict-of-interest
considerations and Hydro-Qu~bec's apparent lack of concern for a
corporate entity in which it had a significant ownership position, raise some
substantial issues. First, one may ask what were the norms of corporate
governance and business ethics at the time and whether in this case those
norms were adhered to. Secondly, the timing of the demand to change
the renewal clause -when CFLCo was known to be at its financial limits
- leads to the question of whether economic duress, or its equivalent in
Quebec law, which governs the contract, was at play.

80. "Quebec claims 'important concessions'.... Churchill contract gets green light," Evening
Telegram (15 July 1968) 3.
81. "What's in it for us?" The Evening Telegram (16 July 1968) 6.
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Whatever the answers to these questions may be, the following
conclusion is in order. It is inconceivable that any party to a commercial
transaction would knowingly and willingly agree today to sell its services
some fifty to seventy-five years in the future at a price fixed below the
current price, except if either forced to do or given commensurate
compensation; in this case, the latter did not happen.
IV. Projectcompletion and thereafter
Following the July 1968 announcement of the agreement, CFLCo's
main tasks were to continue work to meet Hydro-Qudbec's schedule and
to arrange commitments for the major financing. Under Voting Trust
Agreement No. 1, CFLCo had to raise at least $515 million before year's
end or control of the project and, possibly, majority ownership would pass
to Hydro-Qurbec.
In the interim and for most of the rest of the year, CFLCo would
be financed by the funds raised in the $25 million share issue that was
initiated in July and was limited to the existing shareholders. Brinco took
only about $5 million in those shares, and even to do that it had to seek a
loan from the Bank of Montreal. A reluctant bank agreed to this only when
Brinco produced a letter from Rio Tinto-Zinc confirming that a rescue plan
82
for Brinco was in the works.
In August of 1968, Rio Tinto-Zinc put that rescue plan into place. First,
it purchased shares in Brinco directly. Then there was a public offering of
new Brinco shares in November, which Rio Tinto supported by taking any
shares that were not subscribed for. These new funds were sufficient to
permit Brinco to repay its debt to the Bank of Montreal and to buy out Rio
Algom's interest in CFLCo. Later in the year Hydro-Qudbec purchased
all the general mortgage bonds issued by CFLCo. Those bonds were for a
total of $100 million, earning an annual interest rate of 7.5%, and included
one million bonus shares in CFLCo. Once complete, the effect of these
transactions was the following ownership:
Brinco

57.0%

Hydro-Qurbec

34.2%

Newfoundland

8.8%.

The remaining elements of CFLCo's financing plan, namely,
commitments for all the first-mortgage bonds and a loan agreement with

82. See letter dated 5 July 1968 from G. Arnold Hart, the Bank's chairman and chief executive
officer, to Donald Gordon, LAC, CFLCo Papers, MG28, III, 73, vol. 63, file 700.029.
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a consortium of Canadian banks, were successfully in place by the fall
of 1968. Having completed the financing and ratified by-law 13, CFLCo
fulfilled the conditions of Voting Trust No. 1, and so it was terminated in
October. 3
The contract continued to be redrafted into the early months of 1969
but the changes were technical and legalistic. Finally, on May 12, 1969 at
Hydro-Qurbec's offices in Montreal the contract was signed. Jean-Claude
Lessard and Yvon De Guise, signed for Hydro-Qudbec. Signing for CFLCo
were Donald McParland and Eric Lambert.
The project was successfully financed, and the completion guarantee
never invoked. The plant was fully completed in 1976. In the interim,
there had been a change in ownership. After holding office since
Newfoundland became part of Canada, the Smallwood government had
been defeated. The new provincial government embarked on a different
approach to hydroelectric development. After threatening expropriation
of Brinco, it reached an agreement in 1974 to purchase Brinco's water
.rights on the lower Churchill River and its shares in CFLCo. This meant
that the provincial government, through its Newfoundland and Labrador
Hydro Corporation, came to own 65.8% of CFLCo and Hydro-Quebec
continued to hold its 34.2% stake, and CFLCo attained the status of a
crown corporation.
It was not long after the ownership change that Newfoundland
challenged the contract. First, it wanted to recall more Churchill Falls power
.than permitted in the contract and initiated court action on this matter in the
mid-1970s. Secondly, as energy prices peaked in the 1980s, and following
requests to Hydro-Qu6bec to renegotiate terms, the provincial government
passed the Water Rights ReversionAct which was aimed at invalidating the
contract by recalling the water rights that had been leased to CFLCo; as a
prerequisite to proclaiming that Act, the provincial government referred it
to the courts to test its constitutional validity. Both challenges failed in the
Supreme Court of Canada in the 1980s.81
Interestingly in 1979, some eight years after his political defeat,
Smallwood wrote an apologia on his controversial twenty-two-year
premiership. There he briefly dealt with the renewal clause. In contrast
to the "pretty cheap power" remark he had made in 1968, he defended the

83. It was automatically replaced by Voting Trust Agreement No.2, which also gave Hydro-Qudbec
the right to replace the majority of CFLCo's Board and to take majority ownership in CFLCo under
specified circumstances.
84. Supra note 1.
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renewal clause as "fair" and "quite conventional." 5 On the other hand,
John Crosbie, a leading opponent to Smallwood's political dominance in
the late 1960s, has a different perspective. While Crosbie does not deal
specifically with the renewal clause, he claims that the Churchill Falls
project was driven by Smallwood's "ego and grandiose projects dreams
for Newfoundland" and implies that all the blame for the lack of any
benefits lies with Smallwood.8 6 Crosbie further discredits Smallwood by
highlighting that he, with money lent to him and two associates by the
Bank of Montreal, had been trading in Brinco shares when the CFLCo
contract was being negotiated. 87 The facts are that Smallwood was not
party to the contract's negotiation and, more specifically, was not told of
the huge concession on the renewal clause until the day it was publicly
announced. At that point, whether he thought of intervening, what his
personal and political motivations were, and whether he fully understood
the implications, are unknown.
Conclusion
The renewal clause in the 1969 Churchill Falls contract will have immense
consequences. It ensures that from 2016 to 2041 all the economic rent
associated with CFLCo's electricity sales to Hydro-Qudbec will accrue to
Hydro-Qudbec. The value of that economic rent is likely to be enormous.
Yet, surprisingly, the origins of that renewal clause have been almost
completely unknown until now.
This research is the first systematic and comprehensive investigation
of the renewal clause. Hitherto unknown documents were located and
used along with archival information for this purpose. Integrating that
information in the context of the negotiation process sheds new light on
the events that led to such an extraordinary contractual obligation. The
findings raise questions of conflict-of-interest, economic duress, and
business ethics. As the renewal date approaches, both the manner in which
-the renewal clause came about and the one-sided outcome of that clause
ensure that the Churchill Falls Contract will again be a matter of serious
dispute involving political and legal dimensions.

85. Joseph Smallwood, The lime has Come to Tell, (St. John's: Newfoundland Book Publishers, 1967)
at 101.
86. John Crosbie, No Holds Bared: My Life in Politics (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1997) at
101 and 127.
87. Ibid. at133.
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APPENDIX I
Reproduction of C.T. Manning's
Handwritten Notes of February 26, 1968

Correspondence
CTM

(1.)

Renewal
CFLCo/HO - Power Contract
26-2.68
Problem :

How can the term of the Power Contractbe
extended either directly or by option to HQ
by an additional10 to 25 years or a
fixed mill rate?
The function of such an arrangementto permit HQ
to average out a power price that would render the
arrangementso attractiveas to avoid criticismfrom
proponents of the long term advantages of nuclear
power

S
The Water PowerLease

The position in Nfld.

Term & Renewal - Lease is for a term of 99 yearsfrom 16 May '61
(Clause 1 of PartI)
- Lease is subject to Renewalfor a further
99 year term.
(PartIII Clause 2)
Public Utilities Act - Sec. 4 of 1966-67 Act exempts the supply ofpower
developed under lease to HQfrom Public Utilities
Act.

Power Contract

Clause 2 A(])(b) - Def.Of Power Contract:
- 1s, contractexecuted with HQ.
- Excludes any renewal of the contract- or the

renewal of the term prescribedtherein
- "And the saidterm is expected to be about
40 years "
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Term of Tax Rebate Arrangement

2A (2) "duringthe term of the
Power Contract"
Conclusion (1) if the term is to be significantly longer or
shorter than 40 years the lease should be
amended to delete above quotedphrase
the 40 years.
(2) if the extension is to be by option to extend
the term then the lease as presently worded
would probably not convey any tax rebate
benefit in respect of the additionalterm.
(2.)

Observation - it may be that the option approach is the right one
provided the price during the extension period is
on aformula basisso that (a) if the rebate arrangement
cannot be continued the loss to CFLCo is paidfor by
HQ and (b) replacements ofplant and equipment
formingpart of the projectarefully amortizedover the
extension time withoutprejudicingan agreedreturn
to the equity.
The Draft ContractProvisions
- 40 year term establishedon basis of the reasonable
foreseeable life of the plant without major capital
replacements.
- if this is to be lengthened then there should be
an engineeringstudy made of what components
have a life expectancy of SO - or 60 years as may be
agreedand what components would have to be
replacedor substantiallyrepaired.
- with this data and a return to equity concept, it
should be possible to project aflat mill rate on
todays costs --- >

with escalatorfor loss of rebate and additional

capitalcosts. - We would also have to consider
an escalator in operatingcosts and whether or not
this risk would be too great to accept without
an escalator
- Effect of 8% rental.- on mill rate

- H.P Tax Defeats purpose
Notes:

1. Items in italics correspond to the hand-written notes and symbols.
2. Bolded italicized words are ones for which the handwriting was not clear so they are best
guesses.
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APPENDIX II
Reproduction of C.T. Manning's
Handwritten Notes of March 1, 1968

Extension -

[Query Renew for a lesser amount of Powerat.
a reduced Rate]
We can see desirabilityofafixed price.
- Practical& Politicalconsiderations
Practical - ? operatingcosts

- Escalation

rates of wages What will it be in 2012 (?)
-

Replacements in 40 years - Life of components

have to be taken into account.
- Tax rebate arrangements- end in 40 years
- Boyd thinks it should be in contract- we are reluctant
to open with Nfld. - very tricky

This is a very materialmatter.
This to Hydro is like the Completion
Guarantee to CFLCo.
- A do or die condition

-DJM We are sympathetic.

Notes:
1. "DJM" refers to Donald J. McParland.
2. Bolded italicized words are ones for which the handwriting was not clear so they are best
guesses.

